




IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 1
On Optimal Infrastructure Sharing Strategies in
Mobile Radio Networks
Lorela Cano, Antonio Capone, Senior Member, IEEE, Giuliana Carello,
Matteo Cesana, Member, IEEE, and Mauro Passacantando
Abstract— The rapid evolution of mobile radio network tech-1
nologies poses severe technical and economical challenges to2
mobile network operators (MNOs); on the economical side, the3
continuous roll-out of technology updates is highly expensive,4
which may lead to the extreme, where offering advanced mobile5
services becomes no longer affordable for MNOs which thus,6
are not incentivized to innovate. Mobile infrastructure sharing7
among MNOs becomes then an important building block to8
lower the required per-MNO investment cost involved in the9
technology roll-out and management phases. We focus on a radio10
access network (RAN) sharing situation where multiple MNOs11
with a consolidated network infrastructure coexist in a given12
set of geographical areas; the MNOs have then to decide if it13
is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology by deploying14
additional small-cell base stations and whether to share the15
investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of the new small-16
cells with other operators. We address such strategic problems17
by giving a mathematical framework for the RAN infrastructure18
sharing problem which returns the “best” infrastructure sharing19
strategies for operators (coalitions and network configuration)20
when varying techno-economic parameters such as the achievable21
throughput in different sharing configurations and the pricing22
models for the service offered to the users. The proposed23
formulation is then leveraged to analyze the impact of the24
aforementioned parameters/input in a realistic mobile network25
environment based on LTE technology.26
Index Terms— RAN sharing, heterogenous networks, 4G,27
mathematical programming, game theory.28
I. INTRODUCTION29
MOBILE telecommunication networks and services30 have been characterized by a dramatic uptake in the31
past two decades which is still to be over. According to32
[1], the penetration of mobile subscriptions has reached the33
amazing level of 96% worldwide in 2014, and the traffic34
delivered through mobile radio networks is expected to reach35
49 Exabytes/month by 2021 [2] with a considerable share36
taken by bandwidth-eager services provided by aggressive37
Over The Top service providers.38
To cope with such fast growing rate, the mobile networks39
have undergone, and are still undergoing, several technology40
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migration phases cruising from the introduction of third gen- 41
eration (3G) and 3.5G wireless technologies on top of 2G net- 42
works to the standardization and deployment of the Long Term 43
Evolution (LTE) with the recent launch of 5G initiatives [3]. 44
The effect of such rapid evolution in the mobile networks tech- 45
nologies poses several technical and economical challenges to 46
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). On the technical side, 47
the coexistence of multiple technologies in the Radio Access 48
Network (RAN) calls for advanced radio resource orches- 49
tration procedures to cope with such heterogeneity. On the 50
economical side, the combined effect of revenues of MNOs 51
that tend to flatten and the network technology updates that 52
are highly expensive may lead to the extreme where offering 53
advanced mobile services becomes no longer affordable for 54
MNOs which are not incentivized to innovate and migrate to 55
new technologies [4]. 56
In this context, the conventional model according to which 57
each MNO retains complete control and ownership of its 58
network is at odds with the large and frequent investments 59
requested on the network infrastructure, and with the increased 60
complexity in the management of the network components. 61
Mobile infrastructure sharing among MNOs thus becomes an 62
important building block to “break” such vertical and inflexible 63
approach, by lowering the required per-MNO investment cost 64
to cope in the technology roll-out and management phases. 65
Different forms of infrastructure sharing are already in 66
place, ranging from basic unbundling and roaming, to site and 67
spectrum sharing [5]. In these “classical” forms of sharing gen- 68
erally one MNO still retains ownership of the mobile network. 69
On the other hand, we focus here on a RAN sharing scheme 70
in which MNOs share a single radio infrastructure while 71
maintaining separation and full control over the back hauling 72
and respective core networks. In this work, we consider a 73
scenario where multiple MNOs with a consolidated macro 74
cells network infrastructure and consolidated market shares 75
coexist in a given set of geographical areas; the MNOs have 76
to decide if it is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology 77
by deploying additional small-cell base stations and whether 78
to share the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of 79
the new small-cells with other operators. 80
We address such strategic problem by providing a mathe- 81
matical framework for the analysis of the RAN infrastructure 82
sharing problem that takes into account both technical and 83
economical aspects and provides the optimal sharing strategies 84
for MNOs, that include coalitions with other MNOs and 85
network configuration. The proposed infrastructure sharing 86
problem is first tackled from the perspective of a regulatory 87
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entity that can impose sharing configurations maximizing the88
quality of service perceived by all users and then from a89
single MNO perspective, in order to account for MNOs as90
profit-maximizing selfish entities. A Mixed Integer Linear91
Programming (MILP) formulation is proposed to determine92
sharing configurations maximizing the quality of service; this93
formulation includes techno-economic parameters such as the94
achievable throughput and the pricing models for the service95
offered to the users. For representing the MNO perspective,96
we propose a Non Transferable Utility (NTU) coalitional97
game model. The proposed mathematical framework is then98
leveraged to analyze the impact of the aforementioned para-99
meters in a realistic mobile network environment based on100
LTE technology for which numerical values for technical and101
economic parameters are available. Note however that the102
proposed approach is general and can be easily applied to103
other scenarios with different small cell technologies.104
The manuscript is organized as follows: Sec. II reviews105
the mainstream literature in the field of infrastructure sharing106
highlighting the main novelties of the proposed approach.107
In Sec. III, we introduce the reference scenario describing108
the techno-economic parameters involved in the infrastructure109
sharing problem and the proposed mathematical framework110
that allows to represent the problem from the two considered111
perspectives. Sec. IV describes the considered scenarios and112
cases while results and insights are reported in Sec. V, where113
the strategic behavior of MNOs in several different realistic114
scenarios is analyzed. Our concluding remarks are given115
in Sec. VI.116
II. RELATED WORK117
The literature on infrastructure/resource sharing can be118
grouped in two main research tracks: (i) works dealing with119
techno-economic modeling of network sharing and (ii) works120
on practical algorithms for management and allocation of121
shared network resources. The first track mostly includes qual-122
itative and quantitative studies of different sharing scenarios123
and models for estimating capital and operational expendi-124
tures. Particular attention is dedicated to the identification125
of drivers and barriers to network sharing or possible new126
organization of the mobile network value chain for sharing to127
be viable.128
Meddour et al. [6] suggest guidelines for MNO involved129
in the sharing process and emphasize the need for subsi-130
dization and assistance from regulatory entities. Similarly,131
Beckman et. al [7] show that the role of regulatory entities132
is crucial to avoid the decline of market competition.133
A recent work by Di Francesco et al. [8] introduces a134
competition-aware network sharing framework in the context135
of cellular network planning which allows to balance the136
cost benefit of sharing and the push toward next-generation137
technologies.138
The authors of [9] model the capital and operational expen-139
ditures for different levels of sharing and suggest outsourcing140
as the solution to the challenges posed by network sharing.141
In [10], the authors propose a benchmark-based model that142
provides high-quality cost estimates for alternative delivery143
options of the MNO processes such as “regionalization”,144
“centralization” and “outsourcing”. Vaz et al. propose a frame- 145
work to evaluate the performance of heterogeneous network 146
deployment patterns in terms of net present value, capacity, 147
coverage, and carbon footprint [11]. By means of a techno- 148
economic analysis, the work in [12] addresses the cost/revenue 149
viability of different WLAN value network configurations in 150
the presence of MNOs and Service Application Providers and 151
the use cases for which there is incentive to share. 152
In the field of strategic modeling of resource/infrastructure 153
sharing, it is worth mentioning the works resorting to game 154
theory. Malanchini et al. [13] resort to non-cooperative games 155
to model the problems of network selection, when users can 156
choose among multiple heterogeneous wireless access, and 157
of resource allocation in which mobile network operators 158
compete to capture users by properly allocating their radio 159
resources. In [14], spectrum sharing among selfish MNOs in 160
unlicensed bands is modeled as a non-cooperative game. The 161
work in [15] and more extensively in [16] also use a non- 162
cooperative game to model the strategic decision of a MNO 163
regarding sharing its LTE infrastructure in a non–monopolistic 164
telecom market. Another example of 4G infrastructure shar- 165
ing is given in [17] which considers sharing LTE access 166
network femtocells with other access technologies such as 167
Wi–Fi. Cooperative game theory is used in [18] and [19]; 168
in [18], the resource allocation problem in a shared network 169
is formalized in a two step problem: resource sharing among 170
the operators and resource bargaining among the users and 171
Mobile Virtual Network Operators of each operator; the work 172
in [19] considers not only sharing among MNOs but also 173
among operators of different wireless access technologies. 174
The research track on practical aspect of resource/ 175
infrastructure sharing focuses on algorithms and architectures 176
for managing shared resources. The work in [20] suggests 177
that radio resource management is handled by a third-party 178
service provider or an inter-connection provider to preserve 179
competition and reduce exposure. Anchora et al. ([21]) intro- 180
duce a ns-3 implementation to assess the performance of 181
spectrum sharing in a LTE multi-node/multi-MNO scenario, 182
where a virtual central entity is responsible for applying 183
the sharing policies to the common frequency pool. In [22], 184
virtualization of the wireless medium (spectrum sharing) is 185
proposed to exploit spectrum multiplexing and multi-user 186
diversity while allowing MNOs to remain isolated. Instead, 187
the authors in [23] introduce the Network without Borders 188
concept as a pool of virtualized wireless resources with 189
a shared radio resource manager. Along the same lines, 190
Rahman et al. ( [24]) introduce a novel architecture based on 191
wireless access network virtualization, where the key tenet is 192
to offload the baseband process from physical base station to 193
backend devices; in this way, the physical base stations can be 194
sliced into virtual base stations. In [25], instead, a 2-level radio 195
resource scheduling (among MNOs and for each MNO among 196
its user flows) BS virtualization scheme satisfying the 3GPP 197
SA1 RSE ( [26]) requirements has been proposed. The work 198
in [27] proposes the necessary LTE architectural enhancements 199
to adopt capacity, spectrum and hardware sharing, and pro- 200
vides a simulation-based comparative performance analysis 201
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Johansson [28] provides an algorithm for fair allocation of203
the shared radio resource among multiple operators.204
The aforementioned literature work either abstracts away205
technical aspects related to the mobile network performance206
to focus on more economic-oriented analysis and modeling,207
or the other way around. In our previous work [29], we focus208
on infrastructure sharing in a single and homogeneous geo-209
graphical area. To the best of our knowledge, ours is one210
of the first attempts to strike a better balance between these211
two aspects of the sharing problem, by quantitatively modeling212
the relation between technical issues related to the radio213
communication at the access interface (area coverage, trans-214
mission rate, user density and quality observed by users) with215
economic issues (deployment costs and revenues) in mobile216
network infrastructure sharing. In this work we provide a217
more general framework which captures large-scale sharing218
scenarios featuring multiple geographical areas. Further, we219
consider two different perspectives: the single decision maker220
one, where the decision maker is a regulatory authority, and221
the multiple decision makers perspective, that accounts for the222
single MNO point of view.223
III. MODELING THE PROBLEM OF MOBILE NETWORK224
INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING225
We decided to explore two alternative infrastructure sharing226
configurations: socially optimal configurations providing the227
best service level for the users, which can be imposed by a228
regulatory authority1 and stable configurations representing a229
setting where MNOs act as selfish entities aiming to maximize230
their profits from upgrading their network. While a centralized231
approach allows to model the problem of determining socially232
optimal configurations, cooperative game theory is more suit-233
able to determine stable configurations. In Section III-A,234
we introduce the techno-economic parameters representing the235
considered scenario and provide an MILP formulation for236
the centralized approach. In Section III-B, we discuss how237
an NTU cooperative game is adopted to determine stable238
configurations. We remark that in Sections III-A and III-B,239
we use the term coalition with a slight abuse of terminology to240
represent a set of MNOs which build a unique shared network,241
both when they decide to join the coalition based on their242
profit and when the coalition is suggested as a socially optimal243
choice. In III-A, the socially optimal coalitional structure244
(partition of the set of MNOs) is selected according to the245
regulator point of view and each MNO is assigned to its246
corresponding coalition. Instead, in III-B, each MNO joins the247
coalition that maximizes its individual profit; in other words, a248
coalition is stable when none of its members has an incentive249
to leave the coalition.250
A. Socially Optimal Coalitional Structures-an251
MILP Formulation252
We consider a set O of MNOs who have up and running253
3G/4G networks over a set A of dense urban areas: each area254
1It is usually the case that infrastructure sharing agreements are analyzed
on a per-case basis by a regulatory authority aiming to assess the impact of
such sharing agreements on the users; at the limit, regulators could impose
configurations that provide the best service level for the users.
a ∈ A is populated by Na users and has a size Aa . Parameter 255
σi gives the share of users of MNO i ∈ O which is assumed 256
to be equal in each area. The MNOs may consider investing 257
to deploy additional LTE small-cells (HetNets) in some or 258
all the areas. A MNO can either invest by itself or share 259
the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) with a subset 260
(or all) of the other MNOs. Let S denote the set of all possible 261
coalitions that can be activated for the given set of MNOs 262
(here we consider all possible non-empty subsets, thus |S| is 263
equal to 2|O| − 1). If a MNO invests by itself, the coalition 264
is referred to as singleton. Si is the set of coalitions MNO 265
i can be part of. Each MNO inherits the customer base from 266
its current network, assuming that users do not change their 267
MNO but may subscribe to a new (LTE) data plan. 268
We consider the problem of determining the socially optimal 269
sharing configurations, that is, how to partition MNOs in 270
coalitions and how many small-cell base stations (BSs) each 271
coalition of MNOs should activate in order to maximize the 272
global service level provided to the users. 273
In each area a maximum number Umax of BSs can be 274
activated by all coalitions. 275
Users are characterized by parameter δ that represents their 276
willingness to pay for 1 Mbps of LTE rate on a monthly basis 277
and therefore the monthly price of 1 Mbps. 278
We consider an investment lifetime D (in months). The 279
investment costs are then calculated over the whole D period. 280
Both capital (e.g., site and BS acquisition) and operational 281
(e.g., hardware and software maintenance, land renting and 282
power supply) expenditures contribute to the overall costs of 283
the infrastructure [6]. 284
Let gcapex and gαopex denote the fixed CAPEX and annual 285
OPEX components, respectively. gαopex is calculated as a fixed 286
percentage (ξ ) of gcapex , i.e., gαopex = ξgcapex . We denote by 287
g the cost of a single BS for the investment lifetime D which 288
is determined as the sum of the fixed initial CAPEX and the 289
OPEX accumulated during D, i.e., 290
g = gcapex + 112 Dg
α
opex . (1) 291
The BSs installation cost of a coalition is then divided among 292
the coalition members based on their market shares. 293
We assume that the same coalitional structure will apply to 294
all areas, that is, MNOs will be assigned to the same coalition 295
in all areas, as it can be easier for MNOs to coordinate with 296
the same set of MNOs in all the areas.2 Table I recaps the 297
problem’s parameters notation. 298
The partitioning of the set of MNOs O into a socially 299
optimal coalitional structure is modeled as follows. Binary 300
variables ys represent the coalition activation: ys equals one 301
if coalition s is activated in all the areas a ∈ A and it invests 302
(deploys BSs) in at least one of them. The binary variable xis is 303
equal to one if MNO i is assigned to coalition s ∈ Si and s 304
2In the case of stable sharing configurations, as MNOs decide by themselves
which coalition to join, selecting the same coalition (set of collaborating
MNOs) in all the areas might also require less time for the sharing agreements
to be approved by regulators. Nevertheless, we have also investigated the case
in which MNOs are assigned/select a different coalition in each area, which
overall does not provide significant gains with respect to forcing the same
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invests, it equals zero if i is assigned to any other coalition305
in Si but s or s does not invest. Constraints (2) guarantee that306
each MNO i is assigned to at most one coalition from Si .307
Constraints (3) make sure that if s is activated (ys = 1), all308
MNOs i ∈ s are assigned to s.309
∑
s∈Si
xis ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ O, (2)310
xis = ys, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ s. (3)311
If coalition s is activated, it will deploy a certain number of312
BSs for each area a ∈ A, represented by a non-negative integer313
variable uas . If s is not activated or there is no investment314
(ys = 0), the corresponding variables uas , for each a ∈ A,315
are forced to zero by means of Constraints (4). Conversely,316
a coalition is not active (ys = 0) if it does not deploy any BS317
in any of the areas (Constraint (5)); Constraint (6) limits the318
overall number of BSs deployed by all coalitions in each area.319




uas , ∀ s ∈ S, (5)321
∑
s∈S
uas ≤ Umax, ∀ a ∈ A. (6)322
We assess the quality of service provided by MNOs through323
the average rate perceived by the users, which is an important324
indicator of the users’ level of satisfaction. This rate is different325
for each area a ∈ A: firstly because we consider areas with326
different number of users (Na ) and size (Aa) and secondly327
because a different number of BSs (uas ) may be deployed in328
different areas. In the proposed model, we define two types of329
LTE user rate, namely nominal and average, for each coalition330
s ∈ S. The nominal user rate is the maximum achievable LTE331
rate for a certain level of Signal to Interference and Noise332
Ratio (SINR) and a given system bandwidth3 that a user333
perceives when assigned all downlink LTE resource blocks334
from its serving BS. The downlink SINR depends on the335
number of BSs activated by the coalition the user belongs336
to since a larger number of BSs results in the user being337
on the average closer to its serving BS, and thus receiving a338
stronger signal, but also closer to the interfering BSs.4 Thus,339
the nominal user rate of coalition s in area a, represented by340
a non-negative continuous variable ρa,noms , is a function of341
the number of deployed BSs uas . The behavior of ρ
a,nom
s as342
a function of uas is investigated by simulating the deployment343
of the small cell BSs (see Subsec. IV-A).344
Instead, the average user rate perceived by a user of coalition345
s in area a is represented by the continuous non-negative346
variables ρas and defined in terms of the nominal user rate347
(ρa,noms ) and of the load of its serving BS as follows5:348
ρas = ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈s σi Na
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A,349
3We consider a 10 Mhz bandwidth in our simulations whether the BS is
shared or not.
4Since we are considering a nominal rate, any other BS transmission will
use a subset or all the resource blocks and therefore unavoidably interfere.
5We note that this equation is defined for uas > 0, while we set ρas = 0
when uas = 0.
where parameter η is the user activity factor, that is, the 350
probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving BS, 351∑
i∈s σi Na is the total number of users that are served by 352





the average number of users served by one BS in area a. As a 354




which accounts for the average congestion level at a serving 356
BS in a. 357
In the MILP formulation, the nonlinearity of ρas in terms 358
of uas is handled by approximating ρas with a piecewise linear 359
function described by the following constraints: 360
zas ≤ uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (7) 361
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) + M(1 − zas ), (8) 362
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, 363
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (9) 364
where zas are binary variables that equal 0 if uas = 0 365
(Constraints (7)) and therefore set to zero ρas when uas = 0 366
(Constraints (9)). Constraints (8) model the piecewise linear 367
functions approximating ρas , for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, where 368
L denotes the number of the linear pieces, αa,ls denotes the 369
slope of the l-th linear piece, Ua,ls and Ra,ls are the coordinates 370
(number of BSs and user rate, respectively) of the (l + 1) 371
breakpoint whereas M is a big positive constant (see Appendix 372
A for the details of the approximation). 373
Assuming that, in each area a, users of any member of 374
coalition s can be served by any of the BSs activated by s 375
in a, the average user rate provided by MNO i in area a, 376
represented by continuous non-negative variable qai , is equal 377





ρas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (10) 380
As for the investment cost and revenues for the MNOs, it is 381
reasonable to model the revenue6 per MNO i in area a 382
as a continuous non-negative variable rai which is linearly 383
dependent on the MNO’s user rate qai in that area as shown 384
in (11): δqai is the monthly revenue obtained from one user, 385
which is then multiplied by the investment lifetime D and the 386
number of users σi Na of MNO i in area a: 387
rai = δDσi Naqai , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (11) 388
The cost incurred by MNO i in area a, represented by non- 389
negative continuous variable cai , is a linear function of the 390
number of BSs activated in a by the coalition to which i is 391
6The price per unit of service (δ) represents the highest price all current
users of each MNO are willing to pay for the new service. Therefore the
number of users N is assumed independent of δ. Moreover, the proposed
pricing model aims at translating the MNOs level of investment, which affects
the service level perceived by users, into revenues. It is outside of the scope of
the analysis we propose here to account for pricing models in line with those
currently applied by MNOs which involve bundles of services, data caps etc.
In the same lines, we do not account for the user migration among MNOs
since it is generally determined by “non-technical” parameters such as special
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TABLE I
SETS, PARAMETERS, AND CORRESPONDING VALUES
TABLE II
VARIABLE DOMAINS AND DESCRIPTION
assigned, divided among the coalition’s members proportion-392








uas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (12)394
Although the socially optimal infrastructure sharing config-395
urations provide the optimal service level for users, MNOs396
cannot be forced to undertake lossy investments. Therefore,397




(rai − cai ) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ O. (13)400
We consider two candidate objective functions to be maxi-401








Objective (14a) favors efficiency by maximizing the sum of405
user rate over all MNOs and areas, whereas (14b) maximizes406
the smallest user rate (over all areas and MNOs), so as to407
privilege users’ fairness. We denote Objectives (14a) and (14b)408
by T OTQ and M I NQ , respectively and use this notation409
throughout Section V. Sets and parameters describing the410
instances are recapped in Table I whereas variables in Table II.411
In Appendix B, we prove that the decision version of the412
problem with objective M I NQ is NP-complete.413
B. Stable Coalitional Structures - A Non Transferable Utility414
Cooperative Game Model415
We now describe the problem of determining stable416
infrastructure sharing configurations. We assume that MNOs417
in a coalition will share their cost while each MNO will 418
keep its individual revenue since the latter is incurred from 419
its own share of users. As a result, the coalition worth, that is, 420
the difference between the coalition global revenues and cost, 421
cannot be redistributed among its members: therefore we adopt 422
solution concepts of NTU cooperative games [32]. 423
The game is formalized as a pair (O, V ), where the player 424
set O coincides with the set of MNOs and V is a function 425
that associates to each non-empty coalition s ∈ S a subset of 426
payoff allocation vectors (πi )i∈O , i.e., 427
V (s) = {(πi )i∈O : πi ≤ pis ∀ i ∈ s}, 428
where pis is the optimal payoff of player i in coalition s. 429
Since each MNO is a self-interested entity that aims to 430
maximize its individual profits from the investment, we define 431
its optimal payoff pis from a given coalition as the largest 432
profit (difference between total revenues and total cost) it can 433
achieve if it becomes part of that coalition. Such payoffs are 434
calculated in the following fashion: given a coalition s ∈ S, 435
we determine the optimal number of BSs (˜uas ) activated in 436
each area a ∈ A, calculate each member’s revenues and costs 437
for each area and therefore calculate the MNO total profit. 438
The optimal number u˜as of BSs coalition s can deploy in 439




rai − cai (15) 441





guas , ∀ i ∈ s, (17) 443
uas ≤ Umax , (18) 444
zas ≤ uas , (19) 445
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) + M(1 − zas ), (20) 446
∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, 447
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , (21) 448
uas ∈ Z+, ρas ≥ 0, zas ∈ {0, 1}. (22) 449





























⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (23) 452
where ρas depends on uas . As δDNaρas − 1∑ j∈s σ j gu
a
s is inde- 453
pendent of the MNOs, the optimal number u˜as of BSs is the 454
7We remark that, in the problem we upper bound the number of BSs
activated by each coalition in the area to Umax (Constraint (18)) since, for
the considered instances (see Section V), the total number of BSs activated
by any partition of MNOs in the set O does not exceed Umax , that is, the
more stringent Constraint (6) which limits the number of BSs activated by all
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same for all the players and can be easily computed solving455
the above problem.456
























σ j − gu˜as
⎞
⎠ . (24)459
In other words, the optimal payoff allocations pis corre-460





j∈s σ j − gu˜as
)
, among its members462
according to their relative market shares, i.e., σi/
∑
j∈s σ j .463
In the following we look for stable infrastructure shar-464
ing configurations. We define a sharing configuration as a465
partition (s1, . . . , sp) of the MNOs set O, where coalitions466
s1, . . . , sp ∈ S. A configuration (s1, . . . , sp) is said stable if467




> pis j , ∀ i ∈ s′j ,470
that is, for any coalition s j no subset of MNOs has incentive471
to leave it.472
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS473
We run several tests to evaluate how the coalitional struc-474
ture, the level of investment, and therefore the performance475
indicators of both the socially optimal and stable configura-476
tions are affected by the user economic standpoint.477
The MILP model (Section III-A) and problem (15)–(22) for478
any s ∈ S and a ∈ A (Section III-B) have been implemented479
in AMPL [33]. We have used Gurobi 6.0 [34] as a MILP480
solver. All tests were run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M481
CPU @2.6 Ghz. To keep the computational time limited,482
for some of the instances the acceptable relative MIP gap483
of Gurobi was set equal to 1e-6. When optimizing M I NQ ,484
several equivalent optimal solutions may be found, which may485
not provide consistent values for the user rate of the non-486
bottleneck areas and MNOs. When needed, they have been487
computed in post-processing.488
A. BS Deployment Simulation489
A simulation environment was set up to derive the coalition490
user rate per area ρas as a function of each possible number uas491
of BSs that coalition s can activate in area a, i.e., from 1 up492
to Umax . In details, the entire set of Umax BSs is uniformly493
distributed in a pseudo-random fashion on the considered494
square areas; 10 sample users are also randomly distributed495
over each area a. The downlink SINR of each sample user496
in a for each coalition s (SI N Ras ) is calculated for each497
possible value of uas as a function of: the signal power Pk498
the sample user receives from its serving BS k (i.e., the499
BS from which receives the strongest signal), the signal power500 ∑
j =k Pj received from the interfering (non-serving) BSs and501
TABLE III
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SET OF AREAS
the white Gaussian noise signal power8 Pnoise. Since users are 502
characterized by an activity factor η, the captured interference 503
is scaled down by the load of coalition s in area a, i.e., 504




. SI N Ras is therefore calculated 505
as follows: 506









, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (25) 507
The received signal power Prx [d Bm] has been calculated 508
according to a three-parameter path loss model (transmitted 509
signal power Pt x , fixed path loss Cpl and path loss exponent 	) 510
defined within the GreenTouch Consortium [35]: 511
Prx [d Bm] = Pt x [d Bm] − Cpl [d B] − 10	log(d[km]), (26) 512
where d is the sample user–BS distance. The calculated SINR 513
is finally mapped to LTE nominal rate (ρa,noms ) according to 514
a multilevel SINR–to–rate scheme [35]. A single value for 515
ρa,noms is obtained by averaging over the 10 sample users. 516
An additional averaging is obtained by applying 100 iterations 517
for each value of uas ; ρas is then calculated analytically as the 518
product ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈s σi Na
uas , according to the definition in 519
Section III-A. 520
B. Instances 521
We consider three square dense areas (their size and num- 522
ber of users are provided in Table III) and three MNOs 523
(A, B and C) which is quite reasonable for the Italian (also 524
European) telecom playground [16]. Assuming the dense 525
urban areas belong to the same city, we consider the same 526
distribution of users among MNOs in all of them. We report 527
the results obtained for two such user distributions: M1, MNOs 528
have equal market shares (σA = σB = σC = 1/3) and M2, for 529
which the market shares of A, B and C are 10%, 30% and 530
60%, respectively (σA = 0.1, σB = 0.3, σC = 0.6). 531
The values of the user’s willingness to pay for 1 Mbps of 532
service on a monthly basis δ were deduced from current data 533
tariff-plans applied by different Italian MNOs. We have con- 534
sidered 100 values in the range [0.02, 2] e/Mbps which were 535
obtained discretizing the range uniformly with a 0.02 step. 536
The number of available sites for installing small cell BSs in 537
a given geographical area is finite and most likely different for 538
each area. We set Umax to 4000 for all the considered areas; 539
such number of BSs it at least one order of magnitude larger 540
than the minimum needed for coverage9 whereas deploying 541
8The white Gaussian noise signal power accounts for the considered system
bandwidth.
9If we consider small cells of 50 m range, the minimum number of small
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TABLE IV
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS
socially optimal – USER DISTRIBUTION M1
more BSs would result in only a marginal increase of the542
average user rate ρs for the considered instances (see Figure 3).543
The investment lifetime period D is set to 120 months (see,544
e.g., [28], [30]) for all instances.545
For the two user distributions we generate a scenario for546
each value of δ, while the rest of parameters (O, A, Na , Aa ,547
g, Umax , η, D) are fixed to the values provided in Table I.548
V. RESULTS549
In this section, we examine the impact of the user economic550
standpoint (different values of δ) and of the user distribution551
among MNOs (σi ) on the coalitional structures and the level552
of investment first of the socially optimal configurations553
(Subsection V-A) and then of the stable configurations554
(Subsection V-B). The two configurations are then compared555
in Subsection V-C.556
We recall that the user rate as a function of the number557
of deployed BSs for the different sharing configurations was558
obtained by means of simulation (Subsection IV-A) and that it559
behaves nonlinearly in the number of BSs; to obtain a MILP560
formulation of the problem, we have approximated the user561
rate functions with piecewise linear ones (see Subsection III-A,562
Appendix A). In order to account for the error introduced563
by the approximation, we investigate multiple configurations564
which perform very similarly. This allows us to identify565
general trends concerning the size and composition of the566
selected coalitional structures as we vary δ and the user567
distribution. For each value of δ, we consider as socially568
optimal sharing configurations the ones selected by the optimal569
solution of problem (2)-(13), solved either under objective570
T OTQ (14a) or M I NQ (14b), and all configurations for571
which the objective function value is at most 0.5% smaller572
with respect to the optimal one. Similarly, for stable sharing573
configurations, we relax the stability condition as follows: we574
consider a configuration (s1, . . . , sp) to be stable if for any575





> 0.5%, ∀ i ∈ s′j .577
The different outcomes are denoted by the following notation:578
ABC represents the grand coalition, coalitional structures that579
consist of a singleton (i.e., a MNO investing alone) and a580
TABLE V
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS
socially optimal–USER DISTRIBUTION M2
TABLE VI
Socially optimal COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs – USER DISTRIBUTION M1
coalition of two MNOs are denoted by A/BC, B/AC and 581
C/AB,10 whereas the case when no sharing takes place, that 582
is, when each MNO invests by itself, is denoted by A/B/C. 583
For each possible outcome, we report the values of δ for 584
which the outcome is socially optimal under objectives 585
T OTQ and M I NQ in Tables IV and V for user distributions 586
M1 and M2, respectively. The results concerning the stable 587
configurations are reported in Tables VIIIa and VIIIb for user 588
distributions M1 and M2, respectively. 589
Concerning the level of investment, we report the number of 590
BSs deployed by the sharing configurations only for a subset 591
of the considered values of δ (i.e., {0.02, 0.04, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 2}) 592
due to space limitations. For all values of δ for which 593
we have identified multiple configurations (as illustrated in 594
Tables IV, V, VIIIa and VIIIb), we report the results of the con- 595
figuration selected by the optimal solution of the MILP model 596
for the socially optimal configurations in Tables VI and VII, 597
for user distributions M1 and M2, respectively. Similarly, when 598
multiple configurations are stable, only one of them is reported 599
in Tables IXa and IXb, for user distributions M1 and M2 600
10We remark that outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are equivalent for user
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TABLE VII
Socially optimal COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs – USER DISTRIBUTION M2
TABLE VIII
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS stable
TABLE IX
Stable COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs
respectively. The notation concerning the number of deployed601
BSs in Tables VI, VII, IX is the following: for outcome ABC,602
the reported number represents the number of BSs deployed603
by the grand coalition, for outcomes A/BC, C/AB and B/AC,604
the first number represents the number of BSs deployed by605
the singleton whereas the second represents the number of BSs 606
deployed by the coalition of two, whereas for outcome A/B/C, 607
the number of BSs deployed by each MNO are reported in 608
order (i.e., the first number corresponds to A, the second to B 609
and third to C). 610
A. Socially Optimal Configurations 611
As a general rule, results show that as users are willing 612
to pay more (i.e., for higher values of δ) and, as a result, 613
MNOs can afford a larger network cost, the socially optimal 614
configurations consist of smaller and less congested coalitions 615
in order to provide the best service level. Regarding the level 616
of investment, the higher the value of δ, the denser the network 617
deployment as larger revenues make up for increasing network 618
cost. 619
For very low and high values of δ, results are very similar 620
for both user distribution scenarios (M1 and M2). The grand 621
coalition (ABC) outperforms the other configurations for δ = 622
0.02 for T OTQ and for δ ≤ 0.04 for M I NQ for both 623
M1 and M2. Although ABC is selected also for few other 624
low values of δ for both objectives and user distributions, it 625
performs similarly to other outcomes (Tables IV and V): e.g., 626
for M2, ABC is selected by T OTQ also for δ = 0.06 but 627
performs similarly to C/AB. Instead, A/B/C, which represents 628
the case when no sharing takes place, is always among the 629
selected outcomes for δ ≥ 0.06 for both T OTQ and M I NQ for 630
M1 (Table IV) and for δ ≥ 0.28 for T OTQ and for δ ≥ 0.26 631
for M I NQ for M2 (Table V). 632
However, for intermediate values of δ, results seem more 633
sensitive to the user distribution. For M1, the equivalent 634
outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are selected for almost all 635
values of δ in [0.06, 2] for T OTQ and for some values of 636
δ in [0.06, 0.22] for M I NQ (Table IV). However, since they 637
are always selected alongside A/B/C, that is, they perform 638
very similarly to the case when there is no sharing, there 639
is practically no incentive for sharing also for intermediate 640
values of δ for M1. Instead for M2, for δ in [0.08, 0.26], 641
the only socially optimal configurations selected by T OTQ 642
are C/AB and, for a subset of the values of δ in this range, 643
also B/AC (Table Va); similarly for M I NQ for δ in [0.12, 644
0.24] (Table Vb). In C/AB and B/AC, both coalitions of two 645
MNOs, AB and AC, involve A which has the smallest market 646
share (10%) and therefore introduces the minimum level of 647
interference to a coalition. Moreover, for low values of δ, 648
A benefits from being in a coalition since it cannot afford 649
to invest sufficiently by itself given its small market share.11 650
For these values, C/AB is more persistent than B/AC (i.e., it is 651
selected for all δ in [0.04, 2] by T OTQ and all δ in [0.06, 2] 652
by M I NQ ) since C and AB are smaller (less congested) 653
than AC. In turn A/BC, which involves the largest coalition of 654
two MNOs (BC) and the smallest MNO (A) investing alone, 655
is never selected. 656
11For instance, if all MNOs were to invest by themselves, for δ ≤ 0.26
users of MNO A would perceive the worst service level (user rate) due to
A’s low level of investment. Instead, for δ ≥ 0.28, as A is able to densify its
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Concerning the level of investment, in Tables VIa and VIb,657
we report the number of small cell BSs deployed in each658
area for the socially optimal sharing configuration selected by659
the optimal solution under T OTQ and M I NQ , respectively,660
for a subset of the considered values of δ ({0.02, 0.04, 0.2,661
0.4, 1, 2}) and user distribution M1. Results concerning user662
distribution M2 are reported in Tables VIIa and VIIb.663
For most instances, both objectives T OTQ and M I NQ664
provide the same coalitional structures but slightly different665
number of deployed BSs. For instance, for user distribution M2666
and δ = 0.02 (see Tables VIIa and VIIb), the grand coalition667
deploys 5 more BSs under M I NQ compared to T OTQ in668
the largest area (Z1), 16 more in the most congested/dense669
area (Z2), and 22 BSs less in area Z3 (smaller than Z1 and670
less congested than Z2). Since the overall profit of each MNO671
has to be non-negative, objective M I NQ achieves fairness by672
“redistributing” BSs across the areas so that the user rate of673
the worst served ones (Z1 & Z2) is increased at the expense674
of sacrificing the user rate of the better served one (Z3) (see675
also Figure 2 and observation (iv) in Section V-D).676
Similar observations can be made for both user distribution677
scenarios concerning the impact of δ on the number of678
deployed BSs (Tables VI–VII). A little incentive from users679
(small δ) forces MNOs to deploy only a small number of680
BSs in order to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an681
overall positive profit. For example, for user distribution M2,682
δ = 0.02, under objective T OTQ the grand coalition deploys683
169 BSs in area Z1, 156 BSs in area Z2 and 110 BSs in area Z3684
(Table VIIa). However, as users are willing to pay more (larger685
values of δ), more BSs are deployed since higher revenues686
compensate the costs of deploying more BSs. In particular,687
all available sites per area (Umax) are used up in all the areas688
for user distribution M1 under objective T OTQ when δ ≥ 0.4689
(Tables VIa); instead, for M2, the Umax BSs are exhausted690
only in areas Z1 and Z2 when δ ≥ 0.4 whereas in Z3 the rate691
saturation is achieved by deploying less than Umax BSs when692
δ ≥ 0.46 (Table VIIa).693
B. Stable Configurations694
Also for stable configurations, the higher the value of δ, the695
smaller and less congested are the selected coalitions. For low696
values of δ, MNOs prefer to collaborate with a larger number697
of MNOs so as to minimize the network cost. Instead, for698
higher δ, i.e., higher revenues per unit of service provided,699
MNOs prefer to increase the service level, which in turn700
requires building less congested networks, i.e., either shared701
networks with fewer and smaller MNOs or individual ones.702
For user distribution M1 (see Table VIIIa), when δ ≤ 0.52703
there is always incentive for sharing, i.e., each MNO is better704
off building a shared network with at least one other MNO705
than investing alone. The grand coalition (ABC) is stable706
for all values of δ in [0.02, 0.1] and a subset of values in707
[0.16, 0.28] but it ceases to be the stable when δ ≥ 0.3. The708
equivalent outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are stable for all709
δ in [0.02, 0.52] but they become unstable for a subset of710
values of δ in [0.54, 2] which in turn means that in such cases711
no sharing will take place and MNOs will build individual712
networks. However, for δ ≥ 0.3, A/BC, B/AC and C/AB 713
perform very similarly to A/B/C. 714
For user distribution M2 (see Table VIIIb), as δ increases 715
only configurations containing the least congested coalitions 716
of two MNOs remain stable. The grand coalition (ABC) 717
and outcome A/BC (which involves the largest coalition of 718
two MNOs) are never stable for δ ≥ 0.32 and δ ≥ 0.56, 719
respectively. For δ ≥ 0.56, C/AB and, for a subset of values 720
of δ, also B/AC are stable. In particular, outcome C/AB, in 721
which the largest MNO C invests by itself whereas the smaller 722
MNOs A and B collaborate, is always stable for δ ≥ 0.1. 723
Concerning the number of BSs deployed by the stable con- 724
figurations (Tables IX), a little incentive from users (small δ) 725
forces MNOs to activate only a small number of BSs in order 726
to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an overall positive 727
profit. For example, for user distribution M2 and δ = 0.02, the 728
grand coalition is stable and it activates 74 BSs in area Z1, 729
69 BSs in area Z2 and 12 BSs in area Z3 (Table IXb). 730
However, as users are willing to pay more (larger values of δ), 731
more BSs are activated since higher revenues compensate the 732
costs of activating more BSs. 733
C. Comparison 734
We now compare the behavior of the socially optimal and 735
stable configurations. The impact of δ on the two config- 736
urations is overall very similar. However, there is incentive 737
for sharing for a larger range of the values of δ in order to 738
maximize the MNOs profits (i.e., for stable configurations) 739
compared to maximizing the global/minimum user rate (i.e. 740
for the socially optimal configurations). In other words, shared 741
networks can be more beneficial from the MNOs perspective 742
as sharing the network cost allows for larger profits but 743
less beneficial from the user perspective due to the service 744
level degradation experienced in more congested networks. 745
Consider for instance user distribution M1. The grand coalition 746
ABC is socially optimal for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.04] for T OTQ and 747
for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.06] for M I NQ , but it is stable for a larger 748
number of values of δ between 0.02 and 0.28. In general, 749
under M I NQ sharing is selected as optimal strategy only for 750
δ ≤ 0.22, while sharing configurations are stable for a wider 751
range of values (up to δ = 2), which means that for higher 752
values of δ no sharing should takes place in order to provide 753
the best service level, while there is incentive to share in order 754
to maximize the MNOs’ profit. 755
Regarding the level of investment, the higher the value of δ, 756
the denser the network deployment for both configurations 757
as larger revenues make up for increasing network cost. 758
Nevertheless, for the same value of δ more BSs are deployed 759
by the socially optimal configurations compared to the stable 760
ones, as the former focus on the user rate whereas the latter, 761
focusing on the profit, reflect the trade-off between increased 762
revenues and cost. For instance, for M1 and δ = 0.04, the 763
grand coalition is selected by T OTQ and it is stable; however, 764
it deploys 443 BSs in area Z1, 448 in Z2 and 274 in Z3 under 765
objective T OTQ (Tables VIa) whereas in order to maximize 766
the MNOs profit, 157 BSs are deployed in area Z1, 163 in Z2 767
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Fig. 1. Average user rate (Qavg ) and average profit (Pavg) vs. δ–user
distribution M2.
D. Performance Indicators Analysis769
We now analyze how different values of δ impact two770
key performance indicators for the users and the MNOs: the771
average user rate, Qavg =
∑
i∈O,a∈A qai





a∈A (rai −cai )|O| ; when multiple configura-773
tions are selected for the same value of δ (as reported in774
Tables IV, V, VII), we average also over the different con-775
figurations. In particular, we analyze the “price” of imposing776
a fair coalitional structure (objective M I NQ ).777
Results show that the socially optimal infrastructure sharing778
configurations outperform stable ones in terms Qavg and vice779
versa for Pavg . However, as users are willing to pay more, the780
two configuration types tend to provide very similar values of781
Qavg and Pavg.782
As similar observations regarding the behavior of Qavg and783
Pavg as a function of δ can be drawn for both user distributions784
M1 and M2, we report results concerning only M2 in Figure 1.785
As pointed out in Section V-A, the socially optimal con-786
figurations obtained applying objectives T OTQ and M I NQ787
are the same for most instances and they also provide very788
similar Qavg (the largest difference across all values of δ789
is approximately 1.1 Mbps) which can be observed by the790
overlap of their corresponding plots (see Figure 1). Therefore,791
solutions that are fair to all users in all the areas are also792
efficient.793
More BSs are activated by the socially optimal configu-794
rations than by stable ones (see Subsection V-C) which is795
reflected in their corresponding Qavg and Pavg . The difference796
in the Qavg provided by the socially optimal configurations797
and stable ones for δ = 0.02 is nearly 12.6 Mbps (45.8% gap);798
it goes down to 4.3 Mbps (8.1%) for δ = 1 and eventually799
Fig. 2. User rate (Q) vs. profit (P) for each area and MNO – user
distribution M2, δ = 0.02.
becomes nearly 1.8 Mbps (3.3%) for δ = 2. Thus, for high δ, 800
the two types of configurations provide roughly the same 801
quality of service to the users if they are very interested in 802
the new service. 803
As far as Pavg is concerned, for low values of δ, the differ- 804
ence in the Pavg provided by the two types of configurations 805
is significantly different (see Figure 1). For δ = 0.02, the 806
configuration selected by T OTQ provides on the average only 807
55.2 e per MNO, whereas the stable configurations pro- 808
vide 262306.3 e . This suggests that solutions obtained from 809
objectives T OTQ and M I NQ merely satisfy the constraint 810
on having a positive profit while providing, on the average, 811
a 12.6 Mbps higher user rate. However, with the increase of δ, 812
the difference in rate between the two types of configurations 813
becomes negligible, and so does the difference in profit (only 814
2.8% for δ = 2). 815
So far we have investigated the average performance indi- 816
cators (Qavg and Pavg). We now analyze how the user rate 817
per area and MNO (Q) and profit per area and MNO (P) are 818
affected by the characteristics of MNOs (market share) and by 819
the characteristics of the areas (size and population, reported 820
in Table III) for both configurations. 821
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of Q with respect to 822
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M2 when δ = 0.02. We recall that, when δ = 0.02, the824
grand coalition (ABC) is socially optimal (for both T OTQ825
and M I NQ objectives) and stable. For this scenario we can826
observe that: (i) the socially optimal configurations provide827
in every area higher user rates than the stable one, which in828
turn guarantee higher revenues, (ii) the grand coalition results829
in all MNOs providing the same user rate to users of the830
same area, while their profit follows their market shares (see831
Equations (12), (24)), (iii) in area Z3, MNOs obtain a negative832
profit under objective T OTQ , while the global profit for each833
MNO is positive, which indicates that a negative balance834
between costs and revenues can be accepted in some areas835
by the socially optimal configurations, (iv) the objective that836
favors fairness (M I NQ ) improves the quality of service of the837
users of the largest area (Z1) and most congested area (Z2) at838
the cost of lowering the user rate of area Z3 and (v) since the839
user rate provided by a given coalitional structure in an area840
depends on the user density, on the size of the area and on the841
number of BSs activated in that area, a slightly higher user842
rate is achieved for the small, low user density area (Z3) by843
the socially optimal configurations as the LTE nominal rate is844
divided among less users and on the average users are closer845
to their serving BSs.846
VI. CONCLUSIONS847
This work analyzes the strategic situation in which MNOs848
have to decide whether to invest in LTE small cells in dense849
urban areas and whether to share the investment with other850
MNOs. A mathematical framework is proposed to address the851
problem of infrastructure sharing for the considered scenario.852
This framework accounts for techno-economic parameters853
such as the achievable throughput and a general pricing model854
for the LTE service. The problem has been tackled from two855
perspectives: the one of a regulatory entity which imposes856
infrastructure sharing configurations that optimize the quality857
of service perceived by all users and the MNOs perspective,858
which captures their competitive and profit-maximizing nature.859
We propose an MILP formulation to determine socially opti-860
mal configurations (regulator perspective) and adopt concepts861
of cooperative game theory to determine stable configurations862
(MNOs perspective).863
Results show that sharing configurations obtained under864
both perspectives are strongly affected by how much users865
are willing to pay for the new services but they also depend866
on the user distribution (MNOs market shares). Sharing is867
appealing from both perspectives when users are willing to868
pay little, regardless of the MNOs market shares as they all869
struggle with high infrastructure cost. Instead, if users were870
willing to pay more, there is generally more incentive to share871
from the MNO perspective and in particular when MNOs have872
significantly different market shares. For both perspectives, the873
selected configurations involve less congested coalitions, that874
is, coalitions of fewer and smaller MNOs, when the market875
shares are significantly different. When the focus is on the876
quality of service, such configurations behave very similarly877
to the case when no sharing takes place, that is, users are best878
served either by less congested coalitions or when all MNOs879
build individual networks.880
Fig. 3. Simulated nominal user rate (ρa,noms ), average user rate (ρas ) and
adaptive piece-wise linearization for coalition ABC in area Z1 (20000 users,
4 km2).
The proposed mathematical framework has proved to be 881
a flexible instrument of limited complexity to analyze in 882
detail the possible strategies for different infrastructure sharing 883
configurations under different techno-economic conditions. 884
It can be further extended to incorporate spectrum man- 885
agement issues and therefore more elaborated game theory 886
models, as well as different classes of users and heterogeneous 887
technologies. 888
APPENDIX A 889
We recall that the nominal user rate (ρa,noms ) is computed by 890
means of the simulation described in Subsection IV-A whereas 891
the average user rate (ρas ) is derived from ρa,noms according 892
to Equations (27). ρas is then approximated by a concave 893
piecewise linear function in order to formulate the problem 894
as a MILP. 895
ρas = ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈Os σi Na
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (27) 896
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated nominal user rate ρa,noms , 897
the average user rate ρas and the piece-wise linear function 898
approximating ρas for coalition ABC in area Z1 (similarly for 899
all the other considered areas and coalitions). In the following, 900
we explain how the approximation was modeled in the MILP 901
formulation. 902
As mentioned, L denotes the number of linear pieces 903
(intervals) that approximate ρas . We have considered equal 904
values of L for all the coalitions s ∈ S and all the areas a ∈ A. 905
L was set to 11 for user distribution M1 and to 10 for M2. 906
For each interval l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, coalition s and area a, 907
[Ua,l−1s , Ua,ls ] represents the range of the number of BSs 908
that characterize the lth interval, Ra,ls is the average user rate 909
when s activates Ua,ls BSs in a and αa,ls is the slope associated 910
with the lth interval. The average user rate ρas obtained by 911
activating uas BSs, with uas ∈ [Ua,l−1s , Ua,ls ], is therefore equal 912
to Ra,l−1s +αa,ls (uas −Ua,l−1s ). Equations (28) show how these 913
parameters are related with one another. 914
Ra,0s = ρas (1), ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, 915
Ra,ls = Ra,l−1s + αa,ls (Ua,ls − Ua,l−1s ), 916
∀s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (28) 917
In particular, Ua,0s is equal to 1, whereas Ua,Ls is equal to 918
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obtained by activating uas BSs can be reformulated as:920
ρas = minl∈{0,...,L−1}{R
a,l
s + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls )},921
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (29)922
As ρas is maximized by any of the considered objective923
functions, Equations (29) can be replaced by Constraints (8).924
Notice that, the auxiliary binary variables zas equal zero when925
either no BSs are activated by s in a (uas = 0 and therefore926
zas = 0 due to Constraint (7)) or s is not active (ys = 0 and927
therefore zas = 0,∀a ∈ A due to Constraints (4) and (7)).928
In turn, when zas = 0, we should also have ρas = 0, which is929
guaranteed by Constraints (9) while Constraints (8) are made930
redundant by the term M(1 − zas ), where M = 1000.931
APPENDIX B932
The optimization problem with objective M I NQ and Con-933
straints (2)–(13) will be denoted by Infrastructure Sharing934
Problem (ISP).935
Theorem: The decision version of (ISP) is NP-complete.936
Proof: The decision version of (ISP) can be formulated937
as:938
Given a threshold Q¯ > 0 on the quality, are there variables939
ys, zas , uas and ρas , with s ∈ S and a ∈ A, such that Constraints940
(2)–(13) are satisfied and M I NQ ≥ Q¯?941
We will prove that the decision version of (ISP) is942
NP-complete by reduction from the Set Partitioning Problem943
(SPP) which is a well-known NP-complete problem (see,944
e.g., [36]). We recall the decision version of (SPP):945
Given a universe U, a family C of subsets of U and a946
positive integer K , is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| ≤ K947
and each element of the universe U belongs to exactly one948
member of C ′?949
The proof is carried out in 3 steps.950
1) The decision version of (ISP) is a NP problem because951
verifying that a given solution is a YES one requires952
O(|O| + L|S|) number of operations.953
2) It is possible to make a polynomial time transformation954
of any instance IS P P of the decision version of (SPP)955
into an instance II S P of the decision version of (ISP).956
Given IS P P=(U, C , K ), we build II S P=(O, S, A, Na ,957
{σi }i∈O , Umax , L, {Uls }Ll=0, {Rls}Ll=0, {αls}Ll=1, δ, D, g,958
Q¯) as follows:959
• O = U, S = C , |A| = 1, Na = |U|, σi = 1/|U| for960
any i ∈ O, Umax = K , L = K − 1.961
• For any coalition s ∈ S, we set U0s = 1, U1s =962
2, . . . , U K−1s = K .963
• Given an arbitrary coalition s ∈ S, we set:964
R0s = |s|/|s| for any s ∈ S,965
Rls = Rl−1s + αls for any s ∈ S and l = 1, . . . ,966
K − 1,967
• For any coalition s ∈ S, we set R0s > α1s > α2s >968
· · · > αK−1s > 0.969




It is clear that such transformation can be done in971
polynomial time with respect to size of II S P .972
3) II S P is a YES instance if and only if IS P P is a YES973
instance.974
Fig. 4. Graphical illustration of the number of BSs activated by coalitions.
First, we prove the if part. Since IS P P is a YES instance, 975
there is a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| ≤ K and 976
each element of the universe U belongs to exactly one 977
member of C ′. We define the variables 978
ys = zas = uas =
{




R0s if s ∈ C ′,
0 otherwise.
979
It is easy to check that Constraints (2)–(5) are satisfied. 980
Constraint (6) is fulfilled since 981
∑
s∈S
uas = |C ′| ≤ K = Umax . 982
The values of variables zas , uas and ρas guarantee that 983
Constraints (7)–(9) hold. Furthermore, Constraints (13) 984
on the nonnegative profit of MNOs hold because 985
∑
a∈A


















s = 0. 987
Finally, since C ′ is a partition of O, any MNO i belongs 988
to a unique coalition si ∈ C ′ and qai = ρasi = R0si ≥ Q¯ 989
for any i ∈ O, that is M I NQ ≥ Q¯. Therefore, II S P is a 990
YES instance. 991
Now, we prove the only if part. Assume that 992
II S P is a YES instance, i.e., there are vari- 993
ables ys , zas , uas and ρas , with s ∈ S and 994
a ∈ A, such that all the Constraints (2)–(13) 995
are satisfied and M I NQ ≥ Q¯. For any i ∈ O we 996
have qai ≥ Q¯ > 0, hence we get from Constraints (4), 997
(7) and (9) that for any i ∈ O there exists a unique 998
coalition si ∈ Si such that ysi = 1. Thus, uasi ≥ 1 by 999














si = R0si uasi . 1003
Since 0 ≤ rai − cai = ρasi − R0si uasi , we obtain from 1004
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(i.e., ys = 1) the number of deployed BSs is uas = 1.1006
If we define1007
C ′ = {s ∈ S : ys = 1},1008
then C ′ is a partition of U and |C ′| = ∑s∈S uas ≤1009
Umax = K , therefore IS P P is a YES instance.1010
REFERENCES1011
[1] ITU. (2014). ITU YearBook of Statistics 2014, accessed on1012
Aug. 30, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/1013
Statistics/Pages/publications/yb2014.aspx1014
[2] CISCO. (2017). Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile1015
Data Traffic Forecast Update 2016–2021 White Paper, accessed on1016
Feb. 20, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/1017
solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/white_1018
paper_c11-520862.html1019
[3] A. Osseiran et al., “Scenarios for 5G mobile and wireless communica-1020
tions: The vision of the METIS project,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 52,1021
no. 5, pp. 26–35, May 2014.1022
[4] P.-A. Sur, G. Taylor, and T. Robbins-Jones. (2012). We Need to Talk1023
About Capex: Benchmarking Best Practice in Telecom Capital Allo-1024
cation, accessed Jul. 28, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.pwc.1025
com/gx/en/communications/publications/1026
[5] Telecommunications Management Group. (2014). Mobile Infrastructure1027




[6] D.-E. Meddour, T. Rasheed, and Y. Gourhant, “On the role of infrastruc-1032
ture sharing for mobile network operators in emerging markets,” Com-1033
put. Netw., vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 1576–1591, May 2011.1034
[7] C. Beckman and G. Smith, “Shared networks: Making wireless commu-1035
nication affordable,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 78–85,1036
Apr. 2005.1037
[8] P. Di Francesco, F. Malandrino, T. K. Forde, and L. A. DaSilva,1038
“A sharing- and competition-aware framework for cellular network1039
evolution planning,” IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw., vol. 1, no. 2,1040
pp. 230–243, Jun. 2015.1041
[9] T. Frisanco, P. Tafertshofer, P. Lurin, and R. Ang, “Infrastructure sharing1042
for mobile network operators; from a deployment and operations view,”1043
in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Inf. Netw. (ICOIN), Jan. 2008, pp. 1–5.1044
[10] T. Frisanco, “Strategic and economic benefits of regionalization, cen-1045
tralization, and outsourcing of mobile network operations processes,” in1046
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Wireless Mobile Commun. (ICWMC), Aug. 2009,1047
pp. 285–290.1048
[11] F. Vaz, P. Sebastiao, L. Goncalves, and A. Correia, “Femtocell deploy-1049
ment in LTE-A networks: A sustainability, economical and capacity1050
analysis,” in Proc. IEEE 24th Int. Symp. Pers. Indoor Mobile Radio1051
Commun. (PIMRC), Sep. 2013, pp. 3423–3427.1052
[12] M. Katsigiannis, T. Smura, T. Casey, and A. Sorri, “Techno-economic1053
modeling of value network configurations for public wireless local1054
area access,” NETNOMICS, Econ. Res. Electron. Netw., vol. 14, no. 1,1055
pp. 27–46, Nov. 2013.1056
[13] I. Malanchini, M. Cesana, and N. Gatti, “Network selection and resource1057
allocation games for wireless access networks,” IEEE Trans. Mobile1058
Comput., vol. 12, no. 12, pp. 2427–2440, Dec. 2013.1059
[14] F. Teng, D. Guo, and M.-L. Honig, “Sharing of unlicensed spectrum1060
by strategic operators,” in Proc. IEEE Global Conf. Signal Process.1061
Commun. (GlobalSIP), Dec. 2014, pp. 288–292.1062
[15] F. Offergelt, F. Berkers, and G. Hendrix, “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em1063
cooperative and non-cooperative games in network sharing,” in Proc.1064
IEEE 15th Int. Conf. Intell. Next Generat. Netw. (ICIN), Oct. 2011,1065
pp. 196–201.1066
[16] F. H. S. Offergelt, “SAPHYRE: Cooperation among competitors—1067
Analysing sharing scenarios for mobile network operators using game1068
theory,” M.S. thesis, Dept. Netherlands Org. Appl. Sci. Res., Math. Inst.1069
Leiden Univ. Netherland, The Netherlands, 2011.1070
[17] J. Markendahl and M. Nilson, “Business models for deployment1071
and operation of femtocell networks:—Are new cooperation strate-1072
gies needed for mobile operators?” in Proc. 21st Eur. Regional ITS1073
Conf., Copenhagen, Denmark, Sep. 2010, pp. 1–28. [Online]. Available:1074
https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itse10/25.html1075
[18] S. L. Hew and L. B. White, “Cooperative resource allocation games 1076
in shared networks: Symmetric and asymmetric fair bargaining mod- 1077
els,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 4166–4175, 1078
Nov. 2008. 1079
[19] M. A. Khan, A. C. Toker, C. Troung, F. Sivrikaya, and 1080
S. Albayrak, “Cooperative game theoretic approach to integrated band- 1081
width sharing and allocation,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Game Theory 1082
Netw. (GameNets), May 2009, pp. 1–9. 1083
[20] J. Hultell, K. Johansson, and J. Markendahl, “Business models 1084
and resource management for shared wireless networks,” in Proc. 1085
IEEE 60th Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC-Fall), vol. 5. Sep. 2004, 1086
pp. 3393–3397. 1087
[21] L. Anchora, M. Mezzavilla, L. Badia, and M. Zorzi, “A performance 1088
evaluation tool for spectrum sharing in multi-operator LTE networks,” 1089
Comput. Commun., vol. 35, no. 18, pp. 2218–2226, Nov. 2012. 1090
[22] Y. Zaki, L. Zhao, C. Goerg, and A. Timm-Giel, “LTE mobile network 1091
virtualization: Exploiting multiplexing and multi-user diversity gain,” 1092
Mobile Netw. Appl., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 424–432, Aug. 2011. 1093
[23] J. Kibilda and L. A. DaSilva, “Efficient coverage through inter-operator 1094
infrastructure sharing in mobile networks,” in Proc. IEEE IFIP Wireless 1095
Days (WD), Nov. 2013, pp. 1–6. 1096
[24] M. M. Rahman, C. Despins, and S. Affes, “Analysis of CAPEX and 1097
OPEX benefits of wireless access virtualization,” in Proc. IEEE Int. 1098
Conf. Commun. (ICC) Workshops, Jun. 2013, pp. 436–440. 1099
[25] X. Costa-Pérez, J. Swetina, T. Guo, R. Mahindra, and S. Rangarajan, 1100
“Radio access network virtualization for future mobile carrier networks,” 1101
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 27–35, Jul. 2013. 1102
[26] Service Aspects and Requirements for Network Sharing, V.11.0.0, 1103
document 3GPP TR 22.951, 2012. 1104
[27] J. S. Panchal, “Inter-operator resource sharing in 4G LTE cellular 1105
networks,” Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Elect. Comput. Eng., Rutgers Univ., 1106
New Brunswick, NJ, USA, 2011. 1107
[28] K. Johansson, “Cost effective deployment strategies for heterogenous 1108
wireless networks,” Ph.D. dissertation, KTH School Inf. Commun. 1109
Technol., Kista, Sweden, 2007. 1110
[29] L. Cano, A. Capone, G. Carello, and M. Cesana, “Evaluating the 1111
performance of infrastructure sharing in mobile radio networks,” in Proc. 1112
IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2015, pp. 3222–3227. 1113
[30] C. Bouras, V. Kokkinos, and A. Papazois, “Financing and pric- 1114
ing small cells in next-generation mobile networks,” in Proc. 12th 1115
Int. Conf. Wired/Wireless Internet Commun. (WWIC), May 2014, 1116
pp. 41–54. 1117
[31] Z. Frias and J. Pérez, “Techno-economic analysis of femtocell deploy- 1118
ment in long-term evolution networks,” EURASIP J. Wireless Commun. 1119
Netw., vol. 2012, no. 1, pp. 1–15, Dec. 2012. 1120
[32] B. Peleg and P. Sudhölter, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative 1121
Games. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2007. 1122
[33] R. Fourer, D. M. Gay, and B. W. Kernighan, AMPL: A Modeling 1123
Language for Mathematical Programming. Pacific Grove, CA, USA: 1124
Duxbury Press, 2002. 1125
[34] GUROBI Optimizer 6.0, accessed on Apr. 16, 2015. [Online]. Available: 1126
http://www.gurobi.com 1127
[35] Architecture Doc 2: Reference Scenarios, Green Touch—Mobile Com- 1128
mun. Amsterdam, The Netherland, 2013. 1129
[36] M. Garey and D. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide 1130
to the Theory of NP-Completeness. New York, NY, USA: Freeman, 1131
1979. 1132
Lorela Cano is currently pursuing the Ph.D. 1133
degree with DEIB, Politecnico di Milano. Her main 1134
research interests are in the area of techno-economic 1135
characterization of infrastructure sharing in networks 1136





14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Antonio Capone (S’95–M’98–SM’05) is currently1138
a Full Professor with the Politecnico di Milano1139
(Technical University of Milan), where he is also1140
the Director of the ANTLab. His expertise is on1141
networking and his main research activities include1142
radio resource management in wireless networks,1143
traffic management in software defined networks,1144
network planning, and optimization. On these topics,1145
he has published over 200 peer-reviewed. He was1146
an Editor of the ACM/IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON1147
NETWORKING from 2010 to 2014. He serves in1148
the TPCs of major conferences in networking, he is an Editor of the1149
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, Computer Networks, and1150
Computer Communications.1151
Giuliana Carello has been an Assistant Professor1152
with the Operation Research Group, Dipartimento di1153
Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria, Politec-1154
nico di Milano, since 2005. She has published1155
peer-reviewed papers in international journals and1156
conference proceedings. Her research work interests1157
are exact and heuristic optimization approaches,1158
applied to integer and binary variable problems. Her1159
research is mainly devoted to real life applications,1160
such as telecommunication networks or health care1161
management.1162
Matteo Cesana (S’01–M’04) received the M.S. 1163
degree in telecommunications engineering and the 1164
Ph.D. degree in information engineering from the 1165
Politecnico di Milano, Italy, in 2000 and 2004, 1166
respectively. From 2002 to 2003, he was a Visiting 1167
Researcher with the Computer Science Department, 1168
University of California at Los Angeles, Los Ange- 1169
les, CA, USA. He is currently an Associate Professor 1170
with the Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione 1171
e Bioingegneria, Politecnico di Milano. His research 1172
activities are in the field of design, optimization, and 1173
performance evaluation of wireless networks with a specific focus on wireless 1174
sensor networks and cognitive radio networks. He is an Associate Editor of 1175
the Ad Hoc Networks journal. 1176
Mauro Passacantando received the M.S. and Ph.D. 1177
degrees in mathematics from the University of Pisa, 1178
Pisa, Italy, in 2000 and 2005, respectively. From 1179
2002 to 2012, he was an Assistant Professor with 1180
the Department of Applied Mathematics, University 1181
of Pisa. He is currently an Assistant Professor of 1182
Operations Research with the Department of Com- 1183
puter Science, University of Pisa. He has authored 1184
over 40 peer-reviewed papers in books, conference 1185
proceedings, and international journals. His research 1186
is mainly devoted to variational inequalities and 1187
equilibrium problems, concerning both theory and algorithms. In the last years, 1188
he was involved in non-cooperative game theoretic approaches to the service 1189





IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 1
On Optimal Infrastructure Sharing Strategies in
Mobile Radio Networks
Lorela Cano, Antonio Capone, Senior Member, IEEE, Giuliana Carello,
Matteo Cesana, Member, IEEE, and Mauro Passacantando
Abstract— The rapid evolution of mobile radio network tech-1
nologies poses severe technical and economical challenges to2
mobile network operators (MNOs); on the economical side, the3
continuous roll-out of technology updates is highly expensive,4
which may lead to the extreme, where offering advanced mobile5
services becomes no longer affordable for MNOs which thus,6
are not incentivized to innovate. Mobile infrastructure sharing7
among MNOs becomes then an important building block to8
lower the required per-MNO investment cost involved in the9
technology roll-out and management phases. We focus on a radio10
access network (RAN) sharing situation where multiple MNOs11
with a consolidated network infrastructure coexist in a given12
set of geographical areas; the MNOs have then to decide if it13
is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology by deploying14
additional small-cell base stations and whether to share the15
investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of the new small-16
cells with other operators. We address such strategic problems17
by giving a mathematical framework for the RAN infrastructure18
sharing problem which returns the “best” infrastructure sharing19
strategies for operators (coalitions and network configuration)20
when varying techno-economic parameters such as the achievable21
throughput in different sharing configurations and the pricing22
models for the service offered to the users. The proposed23
formulation is then leveraged to analyze the impact of the24
aforementioned parameters/input in a realistic mobile network25
environment based on LTE technology.26
Index Terms— RAN sharing, heterogenous networks, 4G,27
mathematical programming, game theory.28
I. INTRODUCTION29
MOBILE telecommunication networks and services30 have been characterized by a dramatic uptake in the31
past two decades which is still to be over. According to32
[1], the penetration of mobile subscriptions has reached the33
amazing level of 96% worldwide in 2014, and the traffic34
delivered through mobile radio networks is expected to reach35
49 Exabytes/month by 2021 [2] with a considerable share36
taken by bandwidth-eager services provided by aggressive37
Over The Top service providers.38
To cope with such fast growing rate, the mobile networks39
have undergone, and are still undergoing, several technology40
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migration phases cruising from the introduction of third gen- 41
eration (3G) and 3.5G wireless technologies on top of 2G net- 42
works to the standardization and deployment of the Long Term 43
Evolution (LTE) with the recent launch of 5G initiatives [3]. 44
The effect of such rapid evolution in the mobile networks tech- 45
nologies poses several technical and economical challenges to 46
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). On the technical side, 47
the coexistence of multiple technologies in the Radio Access 48
Network (RAN) calls for advanced radio resource orches- 49
tration procedures to cope with such heterogeneity. On the 50
economical side, the combined effect of revenues of MNOs 51
that tend to flatten and the network technology updates that 52
are highly expensive may lead to the extreme where offering 53
advanced mobile services becomes no longer affordable for 54
MNOs which are not incentivized to innovate and migrate to 55
new technologies [4]. 56
In this context, the conventional model according to which 57
each MNO retains complete control and ownership of its 58
network is at odds with the large and frequent investments 59
requested on the network infrastructure, and with the increased 60
complexity in the management of the network components. 61
Mobile infrastructure sharing among MNOs thus becomes an 62
important building block to “break” such vertical and inflexible 63
approach, by lowering the required per-MNO investment cost 64
to cope in the technology roll-out and management phases. 65
Different forms of infrastructure sharing are already in 66
place, ranging from basic unbundling and roaming, to site and 67
spectrum sharing [5]. In these “classical” forms of sharing gen- 68
erally one MNO still retains ownership of the mobile network. 69
On the other hand, we focus here on a RAN sharing scheme 70
in which MNOs share a single radio infrastructure while 71
maintaining separation and full control over the back hauling 72
and respective core networks. In this work, we consider a 73
scenario where multiple MNOs with a consolidated macro 74
cells network infrastructure and consolidated market shares 75
coexist in a given set of geographical areas; the MNOs have 76
to decide if it is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology 77
by deploying additional small-cell base stations and whether 78
to share the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of 79
the new small-cells with other operators. 80
We address such strategic problem by providing a mathe- 81
matical framework for the analysis of the RAN infrastructure 82
sharing problem that takes into account both technical and 83
economical aspects and provides the optimal sharing strategies 84
for MNOs, that include coalitions with other MNOs and 85
network configuration. The proposed infrastructure sharing 86
problem is first tackled from the perspective of a regulatory 87
1536-1276 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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entity that can impose sharing configurations maximizing the88
quality of service perceived by all users and then from a89
single MNO perspective, in order to account for MNOs as90
profit-maximizing selfish entities. A Mixed Integer Linear91
Programming (MILP) formulation is proposed to determine92
sharing configurations maximizing the quality of service; this93
formulation includes techno-economic parameters such as the94
achievable throughput and the pricing models for the service95
offered to the users. For representing the MNO perspective,96
we propose a Non Transferable Utility (NTU) coalitional97
game model. The proposed mathematical framework is then98
leveraged to analyze the impact of the aforementioned para-99
meters in a realistic mobile network environment based on100
LTE technology for which numerical values for technical and101
economic parameters are available. Note however that the102
proposed approach is general and can be easily applied to103
other scenarios with different small cell technologies.104
The manuscript is organized as follows: Sec. II reviews105
the mainstream literature in the field of infrastructure sharing106
highlighting the main novelties of the proposed approach.107
In Sec. III, we introduce the reference scenario describing108
the techno-economic parameters involved in the infrastructure109
sharing problem and the proposed mathematical framework110
that allows to represent the problem from the two considered111
perspectives. Sec. IV describes the considered scenarios and112
cases while results and insights are reported in Sec. V, where113
the strategic behavior of MNOs in several different realistic114
scenarios is analyzed. Our concluding remarks are given115
in Sec. VI.116
II. RELATED WORK117
The literature on infrastructure/resource sharing can be118
grouped in two main research tracks: (i) works dealing with119
techno-economic modeling of network sharing and (ii) works120
on practical algorithms for management and allocation of121
shared network resources. The first track mostly includes qual-122
itative and quantitative studies of different sharing scenarios123
and models for estimating capital and operational expendi-124
tures. Particular attention is dedicated to the identification125
of drivers and barriers to network sharing or possible new126
organization of the mobile network value chain for sharing to127
be viable.128
Meddour et al. [6] suggest guidelines for MNO involved129
in the sharing process and emphasize the need for subsi-130
dization and assistance from regulatory entities. Similarly,131
Beckman et. al [7] show that the role of regulatory entities132
is crucial to avoid the decline of market competition.133
A recent work by Di Francesco et al. [8] introduces a134
competition-aware network sharing framework in the context135
of cellular network planning which allows to balance the136
cost benefit of sharing and the push toward next-generation137
technologies.138
The authors of [9] model the capital and operational expen-139
ditures for different levels of sharing and suggest outsourcing140
as the solution to the challenges posed by network sharing.141
In [10], the authors propose a benchmark-based model that142
provides high-quality cost estimates for alternative delivery143
options of the MNO processes such as “regionalization”,144
“centralization” and “outsourcing”. Vaz et al. propose a frame- 145
work to evaluate the performance of heterogeneous network 146
deployment patterns in terms of net present value, capacity, 147
coverage, and carbon footprint [11]. By means of a techno- 148
economic analysis, the work in [12] addresses the cost/revenue 149
viability of different WLAN value network configurations in 150
the presence of MNOs and Service Application Providers and 151
the use cases for which there is incentive to share. 152
In the field of strategic modeling of resource/infrastructure 153
sharing, it is worth mentioning the works resorting to game 154
theory. Malanchini et al. [13] resort to non-cooperative games 155
to model the problems of network selection, when users can 156
choose among multiple heterogeneous wireless access, and 157
of resource allocation in which mobile network operators 158
compete to capture users by properly allocating their radio 159
resources. In [14], spectrum sharing among selfish MNOs in 160
unlicensed bands is modeled as a non-cooperative game. The 161
work in [15] and more extensively in [16] also use a non- 162
cooperative game to model the strategic decision of a MNO 163
regarding sharing its LTE infrastructure in a non–monopolistic 164
telecom market. Another example of 4G infrastructure shar- 165
ing is given in [17] which considers sharing LTE access 166
network femtocells with other access technologies such as 167
Wi–Fi. Cooperative game theory is used in [18] and [19]; 168
in [18], the resource allocation problem in a shared network 169
is formalized in a two step problem: resource sharing among 170
the operators and resource bargaining among the users and 171
Mobile Virtual Network Operators of each operator; the work 172
in [19] considers not only sharing among MNOs but also 173
among operators of different wireless access technologies. 174
The research track on practical aspect of resource/ 175
infrastructure sharing focuses on algorithms and architectures 176
for managing shared resources. The work in [20] suggests 177
that radio resource management is handled by a third-party 178
service provider or an inter-connection provider to preserve 179
competition and reduce exposure. Anchora et al. ([21]) intro- 180
duce a ns-3 implementation to assess the performance of 181
spectrum sharing in a LTE multi-node/multi-MNO scenario, 182
where a virtual central entity is responsible for applying 183
the sharing policies to the common frequency pool. In [22], 184
virtualization of the wireless medium (spectrum sharing) is 185
proposed to exploit spectrum multiplexing and multi-user 186
diversity while allowing MNOs to remain isolated. Instead, 187
the authors in [23] introduce the Network without Borders 188
concept as a pool of virtualized wireless resources with 189
a shared radio resource manager. Along the same lines, 190
Rahman et al. ( [24]) introduce a novel architecture based on 191
wireless access network virtualization, where the key tenet is 192
to offload the baseband process from physical base station to 193
backend devices; in this way, the physical base stations can be 194
sliced into virtual base stations. In [25], instead, a 2-level radio 195
resource scheduling (among MNOs and for each MNO among 196
its user flows) BS virtualization scheme satisfying the 3GPP 197
SA1 RSE ( [26]) requirements has been proposed. The work 198
in [27] proposes the necessary LTE architectural enhancements 199
to adopt capacity, spectrum and hardware sharing, and pro- 200
vides a simulation-based comparative performance analysis 201
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Johansson [28] provides an algorithm for fair allocation of203
the shared radio resource among multiple operators.204
The aforementioned literature work either abstracts away205
technical aspects related to the mobile network performance206
to focus on more economic-oriented analysis and modeling,207
or the other way around. In our previous work [29], we focus208
on infrastructure sharing in a single and homogeneous geo-209
graphical area. To the best of our knowledge, ours is one210
of the first attempts to strike a better balance between these211
two aspects of the sharing problem, by quantitatively modeling212
the relation between technical issues related to the radio213
communication at the access interface (area coverage, trans-214
mission rate, user density and quality observed by users) with215
economic issues (deployment costs and revenues) in mobile216
network infrastructure sharing. In this work we provide a217
more general framework which captures large-scale sharing218
scenarios featuring multiple geographical areas. Further, we219
consider two different perspectives: the single decision maker220
one, where the decision maker is a regulatory authority, and221
the multiple decision makers perspective, that accounts for the222
single MNO point of view.223
III. MODELING THE PROBLEM OF MOBILE NETWORK224
INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING225
We decided to explore two alternative infrastructure sharing226
configurations: socially optimal configurations providing the227
best service level for the users, which can be imposed by a228
regulatory authority1 and stable configurations representing a229
setting where MNOs act as selfish entities aiming to maximize230
their profits from upgrading their network. While a centralized231
approach allows to model the problem of determining socially232
optimal configurations, cooperative game theory is more suit-233
able to determine stable configurations. In Section III-A,234
we introduce the techno-economic parameters representing the235
considered scenario and provide an MILP formulation for236
the centralized approach. In Section III-B, we discuss how237
an NTU cooperative game is adopted to determine stable238
configurations. We remark that in Sections III-A and III-B,239
we use the term coalition with a slight abuse of terminology to240
represent a set of MNOs which build a unique shared network,241
both when they decide to join the coalition based on their242
profit and when the coalition is suggested as a socially optimal243
choice. In III-A, the socially optimal coalitional structure244
(partition of the set of MNOs) is selected according to the245
regulator point of view and each MNO is assigned to its246
corresponding coalition. Instead, in III-B, each MNO joins the247
coalition that maximizes its individual profit; in other words, a248
coalition is stable when none of its members has an incentive249
to leave the coalition.250
A. Socially Optimal Coalitional Structures-an251
MILP Formulation252
We consider a set O of MNOs who have up and running253
3G/4G networks over a set A of dense urban areas: each area254
1It is usually the case that infrastructure sharing agreements are analyzed
on a per-case basis by a regulatory authority aiming to assess the impact of
such sharing agreements on the users; at the limit, regulators could impose
configurations that provide the best service level for the users.
a ∈ A is populated by Na users and has a size Aa . Parameter 255
σi gives the share of users of MNO i ∈ O which is assumed 256
to be equal in each area. The MNOs may consider investing 257
to deploy additional LTE small-cells (HetNets) in some or 258
all the areas. A MNO can either invest by itself or share 259
the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) with a subset 260
(or all) of the other MNOs. Let S denote the set of all possible 261
coalitions that can be activated for the given set of MNOs 262
(here we consider all possible non-empty subsets, thus |S| is 263
equal to 2|O| − 1). If a MNO invests by itself, the coalition 264
is referred to as singleton. Si is the set of coalitions MNO 265
i can be part of. Each MNO inherits the customer base from 266
its current network, assuming that users do not change their 267
MNO but may subscribe to a new (LTE) data plan. 268
We consider the problem of determining the socially optimal 269
sharing configurations, that is, how to partition MNOs in 270
coalitions and how many small-cell base stations (BSs) each 271
coalition of MNOs should activate in order to maximize the 272
global service level provided to the users. 273
In each area a maximum number Umax of BSs can be 274
activated by all coalitions. 275
Users are characterized by parameter δ that represents their 276
willingness to pay for 1 Mbps of LTE rate on a monthly basis 277
and therefore the monthly price of 1 Mbps. 278
We consider an investment lifetime D (in months). The 279
investment costs are then calculated over the whole D period. 280
Both capital (e.g., site and BS acquisition) and operational 281
(e.g., hardware and software maintenance, land renting and 282
power supply) expenditures contribute to the overall costs of 283
the infrastructure [6]. 284
Let gcapex and gαopex denote the fixed CAPEX and annual 285
OPEX components, respectively. gαopex is calculated as a fixed 286
percentage (ξ ) of gcapex , i.e., gαopex = ξgcapex . We denote by 287
g the cost of a single BS for the investment lifetime D which 288
is determined as the sum of the fixed initial CAPEX and the 289
OPEX accumulated during D, i.e., 290
g = gcapex + 112 Dg
α
opex . (1) 291
The BSs installation cost of a coalition is then divided among 292
the coalition members based on their market shares. 293
We assume that the same coalitional structure will apply to 294
all areas, that is, MNOs will be assigned to the same coalition 295
in all areas, as it can be easier for MNOs to coordinate with 296
the same set of MNOs in all the areas.2 Table I recaps the 297
problem’s parameters notation. 298
The partitioning of the set of MNOs O into a socially 299
optimal coalitional structure is modeled as follows. Binary 300
variables ys represent the coalition activation: ys equals one 301
if coalition s is activated in all the areas a ∈ A and it invests 302
(deploys BSs) in at least one of them. The binary variable xis is 303
equal to one if MNO i is assigned to coalition s ∈ Si and s 304
2In the case of stable sharing configurations, as MNOs decide by themselves
which coalition to join, selecting the same coalition (set of collaborating
MNOs) in all the areas might also require less time for the sharing agreements
to be approved by regulators. Nevertheless, we have also investigated the case
in which MNOs are assigned/select a different coalition in each area, which
overall does not provide significant gains with respect to forcing the same
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invests, it equals zero if i is assigned to any other coalition305
in Si but s or s does not invest. Constraints (2) guarantee that306
each MNO i is assigned to at most one coalition from Si .307
Constraints (3) make sure that if s is activated (ys = 1), all308
MNOs i ∈ s are assigned to s.309
∑
s∈Si
xis ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ O, (2)310
xis = ys, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ s. (3)311
If coalition s is activated, it will deploy a certain number of312
BSs for each area a ∈ A, represented by a non-negative integer313
variable uas . If s is not activated or there is no investment314
(ys = 0), the corresponding variables uas , for each a ∈ A,315
are forced to zero by means of Constraints (4). Conversely,316
a coalition is not active (ys = 0) if it does not deploy any BS317
in any of the areas (Constraint (5)); Constraint (6) limits the318
overall number of BSs deployed by all coalitions in each area.319




uas , ∀ s ∈ S, (5)321
∑
s∈S
uas ≤ Umax, ∀ a ∈ A. (6)322
We assess the quality of service provided by MNOs through323
the average rate perceived by the users, which is an important324
indicator of the users’ level of satisfaction. This rate is different325
for each area a ∈ A: firstly because we consider areas with326
different number of users (Na ) and size (Aa) and secondly327
because a different number of BSs (uas ) may be deployed in328
different areas. In the proposed model, we define two types of329
LTE user rate, namely nominal and average, for each coalition330
s ∈ S. The nominal user rate is the maximum achievable LTE331
rate for a certain level of Signal to Interference and Noise332
Ratio (SINR) and a given system bandwidth3 that a user333
perceives when assigned all downlink LTE resource blocks334
from its serving BS. The downlink SINR depends on the335
number of BSs activated by the coalition the user belongs336
to since a larger number of BSs results in the user being337
on the average closer to its serving BS, and thus receiving a338
stronger signal, but also closer to the interfering BSs.4 Thus,339
the nominal user rate of coalition s in area a, represented by340
a non-negative continuous variable ρa,noms , is a function of341
the number of deployed BSs uas . The behavior of ρ
a,nom
s as342
a function of uas is investigated by simulating the deployment343
of the small cell BSs (see Subsec. IV-A).344
Instead, the average user rate perceived by a user of coalition345
s in area a is represented by the continuous non-negative346
variables ρas and defined in terms of the nominal user rate347
(ρa,noms ) and of the load of its serving BS as follows5:348
ρas = ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈s σi Na
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A,349
3We consider a 10 Mhz bandwidth in our simulations whether the BS is
shared or not.
4Since we are considering a nominal rate, any other BS transmission will
use a subset or all the resource blocks and therefore unavoidably interfere.
5We note that this equation is defined for uas > 0, while we set ρas = 0
when uas = 0.
where parameter η is the user activity factor, that is, the 350
probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving BS, 351∑
i∈s σi Na is the total number of users that are served by 352





the average number of users served by one BS in area a. As a 354




which accounts for the average congestion level at a serving 356
BS in a. 357
In the MILP formulation, the nonlinearity of ρas in terms 358
of uas is handled by approximating ρas with a piecewise linear 359
function described by the following constraints: 360
zas ≤ uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (7) 361
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) + M(1 − zas ), (8) 362
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, 363
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (9) 364
where zas are binary variables that equal 0 if uas = 0 365
(Constraints (7)) and therefore set to zero ρas when uas = 0 366
(Constraints (9)). Constraints (8) model the piecewise linear 367
functions approximating ρas , for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, where 368
L denotes the number of the linear pieces, αa,ls denotes the 369
slope of the l-th linear piece, U a,ls and Ra,ls are the coordinates 370
(number of BSs and user rate, respectively) of the (l + 1) 371
breakpoint whereas M is a big positive constant (see Appendix 372
A for the details of the approximation). 373
Assuming that, in each area a, users of any member of 374
coalition s can be served by any of the BSs activated by s 375
in a, the average user rate provided by MNO i in area a, 376
represented by continuous non-negative variable qai , is equal 377





ρas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (10) 380
As for the investment cost and revenues for the MNOs, it is 381
reasonable to model the revenue6 per MNO i in area a 382
as a continuous non-negative variable rai which is linearly 383
dependent on the MNO’s user rate qai in that area as shown 384
in (11): δqai is the monthly revenue obtained from one user, 385
which is then multiplied by the investment lifetime D and the 386
number of users σi Na of MNO i in area a: 387
rai = δDσi Naqai , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (11) 388
The cost incurred by MNO i in area a, represented by non- 389
negative continuous variable cai , is a linear function of the 390
number of BSs activated in a by the coalition to which i is 391
6The price per unit of service (δ) represents the highest price all current
users of each MNO are willing to pay for the new service. Therefore the
number of users N is assumed independent of δ. Moreover, the proposed
pricing model aims at translating the MNOs level of investment, which affects
the service level perceived by users, into revenues. It is outside of the scope of
the analysis we propose here to account for pricing models in line with those
currently applied by MNOs which involve bundles of services, data caps etc.
In the same lines, we do not account for the user migration among MNOs
since it is generally determined by “non-technical” parameters such as special
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TABLE I
SETS, PARAMETERS, AND CORRESPONDING VALUES
TABLE II
VARIABLE DOMAINS AND DESCRIPTION
assigned, divided among the coalition’s members proportion-392








uas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (12)394
Although the socially optimal infrastructure sharing config-395
urations provide the optimal service level for users, MNOs396
cannot be forced to undertake lossy investments. Therefore,397




(rai − cai ) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ O. (13)400
We consider two candidate objective functions to be maxi-401








Objective (14a) favors efficiency by maximizing the sum of405
user rate over all MNOs and areas, whereas (14b) maximizes406
the smallest user rate (over all areas and MNOs), so as to407
privilege users’ fairness. We denote Objectives (14a) and (14b)408
by T OTQ and M I NQ , respectively and use this notation409
throughout Section V. Sets and parameters describing the410
instances are recapped in Table I whereas variables in Table II.411
In Appendix B, we prove that the decision version of the412
problem with objective M I NQ is NP-complete.413
B. Stable Coalitional Structures - A Non Transferable Utility414
Cooperative Game Model415
We now describe the problem of determining stable416
infrastructure sharing configurations. We assume that MNOs417
in a coalition will share their cost while each MNO will 418
keep its individual revenue since the latter is incurred from 419
its own share of users. As a result, the coalition worth, that is, 420
the difference between the coalition global revenues and cost, 421
cannot be redistributed among its members: therefore we adopt 422
solution concepts of NTU cooperative games [32]. 423
The game is formalized as a pair (O, V ), where the player 424
set O coincides with the set of MNOs and V is a function 425
that associates to each non-empty coalition s ∈ S a subset of 426
payoff allocation vectors (πi )i∈O , i.e., 427
V (s) = {(πi )i∈O : πi ≤ pis ∀ i ∈ s}, 428
where pis is the optimal payoff of player i in coalition s. 429
Since each MNO is a self-interested entity that aims to 430
maximize its individual profits from the investment, we define 431
its optimal payoff pis from a given coalition as the largest 432
profit (difference between total revenues and total cost) it can 433
achieve if it becomes part of that coalition. Such payoffs are 434
calculated in the following fashion: given a coalition s ∈ S, 435
we determine the optimal number of BSs (˜uas ) activated in 436
each area a ∈ A, calculate each member’s revenues and costs 437
for each area and therefore calculate the MNO total profit. 438
The optimal number u˜as of BSs coalition s can deploy in 439




rai − cai (15) 441





guas , ∀ i ∈ s, (17) 443
uas ≤ Umax , (18) 444
zas ≤ uas , (19) 445
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) + M(1 − zas ), (20) 446
∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, 447
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , (21) 448
uas ∈ Z+, ρas ≥ 0, zas ∈ {0, 1}. (22) 449





























⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (23) 452
where ρas depends on uas . As δDNaρas − 1∑ j∈s σ j gu
a
s is inde- 453
pendent of the MNOs, the optimal number u˜as of BSs is the 454
7We remark that, in the problem we upper bound the number of BSs
activated by each coalition in the area to Umax (Constraint (18)) since, for
the considered instances (see Section V), the total number of BSs activated
by any partition of MNOs in the set O does not exceed Umax , that is, the
more stringent Constraint (6) which limits the number of BSs activated by all
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same for all the players and can be easily computed solving455
the above problem.456
























σ j − gu˜as
⎞
⎠ . (24)459
In other words, the optimal payoff allocations pis corre-460





j∈s σ j − gu˜as
)
, among its members462
according to their relative market shares, i.e., σi/
∑
j∈s σ j .463
In the following we look for stable infrastructure shar-464
ing configurations. We define a sharing configuration as a465
partition (s1, . . . , sp) of the MNOs set O, where coalitions466
s1, . . . , sp ∈ S. A configuration (s1, . . . , sp) is said stable if467




> pis j , ∀ i ∈ s′j ,470
that is, for any coalition s j no subset of MNOs has incentive471
to leave it.472
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS473
We run several tests to evaluate how the coalitional struc-474
ture, the level of investment, and therefore the performance475
indicators of both the socially optimal and stable configura-476
tions are affected by the user economic standpoint.477
The MILP model (Section III-A) and problem (15)–(22) for478
any s ∈ S and a ∈ A (Section III-B) have been implemented479
in AMPL [33]. We have used Gurobi 6.0 [34] as a MILP480
solver. All tests were run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M481
CPU @2.6 Ghz. To keep the computational time limited,482
for some of the instances the acceptable relative MIP gap483
of Gurobi was set equal to 1e-6. When optimizing M I NQ ,484
several equivalent optimal solutions may be found, which may485
not provide consistent values for the user rate of the non-486
bottleneck areas and MNOs. When needed, they have been487
computed in post-processing.488
A. BS Deployment Simulation489
A simulation environment was set up to derive the coalition490
user rate per area ρas as a function of each possible number uas491
of BSs that coalition s can activate in area a, i.e., from 1 up492
to Umax . In details, the entire set of Umax BSs is uniformly493
distributed in a pseudo-random fashion on the considered494
square areas; 10 sample users are also randomly distributed495
over each area a. The downlink SINR of each sample user496
in a for each coalition s (SI N Ras ) is calculated for each497
possible value of uas as a function of: the signal power Pk498
the sample user receives from its serving BS k (i.e., the499
BS from which receives the strongest signal), the signal power500 ∑
j =k Pj received from the interfering (non-serving) BSs and501
TABLE III
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SET OF AREAS
the white Gaussian noise signal power8 Pnoise. Since users are 502
characterized by an activity factor η, the captured interference 503
is scaled down by the load of coalition s in area a, i.e., 504




. SI N Ras is therefore calculated 505
as follows: 506









, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (25) 507
The received signal power Prx [d Bm] has been calculated 508
according to a three-parameter path loss model (transmitted 509
signal power Pt x , fixed path loss Cpl and path loss exponent 	) 510
defined within the GreenTouch Consortium [35]: 511
Prx [d Bm] = Pt x [d Bm] − Cpl [d B] − 10	log(d[km]), (26) 512
where d is the sample user–BS distance. The calculated SINR 513
is finally mapped to LTE nominal rate (ρa,noms ) according to 514
a multilevel SINR–to–rate scheme [35]. A single value for 515
ρa,noms is obtained by averaging over the 10 sample users. 516
An additional averaging is obtained by applying 100 iterations 517
for each value of uas ; ρas is then calculated analytically as the 518
product ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈s σi Na
uas , according to the definition in 519
Section III-A. 520
B. Instances 521
We consider three square dense areas (their size and num- 522
ber of users are provided in Table III) and three MNOs 523
(A, B and C) which is quite reasonable for the Italian (also 524
European) telecom playground [16]. Assuming the dense 525
urban areas belong to the same city, we consider the same 526
distribution of users among MNOs in all of them. We report 527
the results obtained for two such user distributions: M1, MNOs 528
have equal market shares (σA = σB = σC = 1/3) and M2, for 529
which the market shares of A, B and C are 10%, 30% and 530
60%, respectively (σA = 0.1, σB = 0.3, σC = 0.6). 531
The values of the user’s willingness to pay for 1 Mbps of 532
service on a monthly basis δ were deduced from current data 533
tariff-plans applied by different Italian MNOs. We have con- 534
sidered 100 values in the range [0.02, 2] e/Mbps which were 535
obtained discretizing the range uniformly with a 0.02 step. 536
The number of available sites for installing small cell BSs in 537
a given geographical area is finite and most likely different for 538
each area. We set Umax to 4000 for all the considered areas; 539
such number of BSs it at least one order of magnitude larger 540
than the minimum needed for coverage9 whereas deploying 541
8The white Gaussian noise signal power accounts for the considered system
bandwidth.
9If we consider small cells of 50 m range, the minimum number of small
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TABLE IV
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS
socially optimal – USER DISTRIBUTION M1
more BSs would result in only a marginal increase of the542
average user rate ρs for the considered instances (see Figure 3).543
The investment lifetime period D is set to 120 months (see,544
e.g., [28], [30]) for all instances.545
For the two user distributions we generate a scenario for546
each value of δ, while the rest of parameters (O, A, Na , Aa ,547
g, Umax , η, D) are fixed to the values provided in Table I.548
V. RESULTS549
In this section, we examine the impact of the user economic550
standpoint (different values of δ) and of the user distribution551
among MNOs (σi ) on the coalitional structures and the level552
of investment first of the socially optimal configurations553
(Subsection V-A) and then of the stable configurations554
(Subsection V-B). The two configurations are then compared555
in Subsection V-C.556
We recall that the user rate as a function of the number557
of deployed BSs for the different sharing configurations was558
obtained by means of simulation (Subsection IV-A) and that it559
behaves nonlinearly in the number of BSs; to obtain a MILP560
formulation of the problem, we have approximated the user561
rate functions with piecewise linear ones (see Subsection III-A,562
Appendix A). In order to account for the error introduced563
by the approximation, we investigate multiple configurations564
which perform very similarly. This allows us to identify565
general trends concerning the size and composition of the566
selected coalitional structures as we vary δ and the user567
distribution. For each value of δ, we consider as socially568
optimal sharing configurations the ones selected by the optimal569
solution of problem (2)-(13), solved either under objective570
T OTQ (14a) or M I NQ (14b), and all configurations for571
which the objective function value is at most 0.5% smaller572
with respect to the optimal one. Similarly, for stable sharing573
configurations, we relax the stability condition as follows: we574
consider a configuration (s1, . . . , sp) to be stable if for any575





> 0.5%, ∀ i ∈ s′j .577
The different outcomes are denoted by the following notation:578
ABC represents the grand coalition, coalitional structures that579
consist of a singleton (i.e., a MNO investing alone) and a580
TABLE V
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS
socially optimal–USER DISTRIBUTION M2
TABLE VI
Socially optimal COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs – USER DISTRIBUTION M1
coalition of two MNOs are denoted by A/BC, B/AC and 581
C/AB,10 whereas the case when no sharing takes place, that 582
is, when each MNO invests by itself, is denoted by A/B/C. 583
For each possible outcome, we report the values of δ for 584
which the outcome is socially optimal under objectives 585
T OTQ and M I NQ in Tables IV and V for user distributions 586
M1 and M2, respectively. The results concerning the stable 587
configurations are reported in Tables VIIIa and VIIIb for user 588
distributions M1 and M2, respectively. 589
Concerning the level of investment, we report the number of 590
BSs deployed by the sharing configurations only for a subset 591
of the considered values of δ (i.e., {0.02, 0.04, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 2}) 592
due to space limitations. For all values of δ for which 593
we have identified multiple configurations (as illustrated in 594
Tables IV, V, VIIIa and VIIIb), we report the results of the con- 595
figuration selected by the optimal solution of the MILP model 596
for the socially optimal configurations in Tables VI and VII, 597
for user distributions M1 and M2, respectively. Similarly, when 598
multiple configurations are stable, only one of them is reported 599
in Tables IXa and IXb, for user distributions M1 and M2 600
10We remark that outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are equivalent for user
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TABLE VII
Socially optimal COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs – USER DISTRIBUTION M2
TABLE VIII
VALUES OF δ FOR WHICH A COALITIONAL STRUCTURE IS stable
TABLE IX
Stable COALITIONAL STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING
NUMBER OF ACTIVATED BSs
respectively. The notation concerning the number of deployed601
BSs in Tables VI, VII, IX is the following: for outcome ABC,602
the reported number represents the number of BSs deployed603
by the grand coalition, for outcomes A/BC, C/AB and B/AC,604
the first number represents the number of BSs deployed by605
the singleton whereas the second represents the number of BSs 606
deployed by the coalition of two, whereas for outcome A/B/C, 607
the number of BSs deployed by each MNO are reported in 608
order (i.e., the first number corresponds to A, the second to B 609
and third to C). 610
A. Socially Optimal Configurations 611
As a general rule, results show that as users are willing 612
to pay more (i.e., for higher values of δ) and, as a result, 613
MNOs can afford a larger network cost, the socially optimal 614
configurations consist of smaller and less congested coalitions 615
in order to provide the best service level. Regarding the level 616
of investment, the higher the value of δ, the denser the network 617
deployment as larger revenues make up for increasing network 618
cost. 619
For very low and high values of δ, results are very similar 620
for both user distribution scenarios (M1 and M2). The grand 621
coalition (ABC) outperforms the other configurations for δ = 622
0.02 for T OTQ and for δ ≤ 0.04 for M I NQ for both 623
M1 and M2. Although ABC is selected also for few other 624
low values of δ for both objectives and user distributions, it 625
performs similarly to other outcomes (Tables IV and V): e.g., 626
for M2, ABC is selected by T OTQ also for δ = 0.06 but 627
performs similarly to C/AB. Instead, A/B/C, which represents 628
the case when no sharing takes place, is always among the 629
selected outcomes for δ ≥ 0.06 for both T OTQ and M I NQ for 630
M1 (Table IV) and for δ ≥ 0.28 for T OTQ and for δ ≥ 0.26 631
for M I NQ for M2 (Table V). 632
However, for intermediate values of δ, results seem more 633
sensitive to the user distribution. For M1, the equivalent 634
outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are selected for almost all 635
values of δ in [0.06, 2] for T OTQ and for some values of 636
δ in [0.06, 0.22] for M I NQ (Table IV). However, since they 637
are always selected alongside A/B/C, that is, they perform 638
very similarly to the case when there is no sharing, there 639
is practically no incentive for sharing also for intermediate 640
values of δ for M1. Instead for M2, for δ in [0.08, 0.26], 641
the only socially optimal configurations selected by T OTQ 642
are C/AB and, for a subset of the values of δ in this range, 643
also B/AC (Table Va); similarly for M I NQ for δ in [0.12, 644
0.24] (Table Vb). In C/AB and B/AC, both coalitions of two 645
MNOs, AB and AC, involve A which has the smallest market 646
share (10%) and therefore introduces the minimum level of 647
interference to a coalition. Moreover, for low values of δ, 648
A benefits from being in a coalition since it cannot afford 649
to invest sufficiently by itself given its small market share.11 650
For these values, C/AB is more persistent than B/AC (i.e., it is 651
selected for all δ in [0.04, 2] by T OTQ and all δ in [0.06, 2] 652
by M I NQ ) since C and AB are smaller (less congested) 653
than AC. In turn A/BC, which involves the largest coalition of 654
two MNOs (BC) and the smallest MNO (A) investing alone, 655
is never selected. 656
11For instance, if all MNOs were to invest by themselves, for δ ≤ 0.26
users of MNO A would perceive the worst service level (user rate) due to
A’s low level of investment. Instead, for δ ≥ 0.28, as A is able to densify its
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Concerning the level of investment, in Tables VIa and VIb,657
we report the number of small cell BSs deployed in each658
area for the socially optimal sharing configuration selected by659
the optimal solution under T OTQ and M I NQ , respectively,660
for a subset of the considered values of δ ({0.02, 0.04, 0.2,661
0.4, 1, 2}) and user distribution M1. Results concerning user662
distribution M2 are reported in Tables VIIa and VIIb.663
For most instances, both objectives T OTQ and M I NQ664
provide the same coalitional structures but slightly different665
number of deployed BSs. For instance, for user distribution M2666
and δ = 0.02 (see Tables VIIa and VIIb), the grand coalition667
deploys 5 more BSs under M I NQ compared to T OTQ in668
the largest area (Z1), 16 more in the most congested/dense669
area (Z2), and 22 BSs less in area Z3 (smaller than Z1 and670
less congested than Z2). Since the overall profit of each MNO671
has to be non-negative, objective M I NQ achieves fairness by672
“redistributing” BSs across the areas so that the user rate of673
the worst served ones (Z1 & Z2) is increased at the expense674
of sacrificing the user rate of the better served one (Z3) (see675
also Figure 2 and observation (iv) in Section V-D).676
Similar observations can be made for both user distribution677
scenarios concerning the impact of δ on the number of678
deployed BSs (Tables VI–VII). A little incentive from users679
(small δ) forces MNOs to deploy only a small number of680
BSs in order to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an681
overall positive profit. For example, for user distribution M2,682
δ = 0.02, under objective T OTQ the grand coalition deploys683
169 BSs in area Z1, 156 BSs in area Z2 and 110 BSs in area Z3684
(Table VIIa). However, as users are willing to pay more (larger685
values of δ), more BSs are deployed since higher revenues686
compensate the costs of deploying more BSs. In particular,687
all available sites per area (Umax) are used up in all the areas688
for user distribution M1 under objective T OTQ when δ ≥ 0.4689
(Tables VIa); instead, for M2, the Umax BSs are exhausted690
only in areas Z1 and Z2 when δ ≥ 0.4 whereas in Z3 the rate691
saturation is achieved by deploying less than Umax BSs when692
δ ≥ 0.46 (Table VIIa).693
B. Stable Configurations694
Also for stable configurations, the higher the value of δ, the695
smaller and less congested are the selected coalitions. For low696
values of δ, MNOs prefer to collaborate with a larger number697
of MNOs so as to minimize the network cost. Instead, for698
higher δ, i.e., higher revenues per unit of service provided,699
MNOs prefer to increase the service level, which in turn700
requires building less congested networks, i.e., either shared701
networks with fewer and smaller MNOs or individual ones.702
For user distribution M1 (see Table VIIIa), when δ ≤ 0.52703
there is always incentive for sharing, i.e., each MNO is better704
off building a shared network with at least one other MNO705
than investing alone. The grand coalition (ABC) is stable706
for all values of δ in [0.02, 0.1] and a subset of values in707
[0.16, 0.28] but it ceases to be the stable when δ ≥ 0.3. The708
equivalent outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are stable for all709
δ in [0.02, 0.52] but they become unstable for a subset of710
values of δ in [0.54, 2] which in turn means that in such cases711
no sharing will take place and MNOs will build individual712
networks. However, for δ ≥ 0.3, A/BC, B/AC and C/AB 713
perform very similarly to A/B/C. 714
For user distribution M2 (see Table VIIIb), as δ increases 715
only configurations containing the least congested coalitions 716
of two MNOs remain stable. The grand coalition (ABC) 717
and outcome A/BC (which involves the largest coalition of 718
two MNOs) are never stable for δ ≥ 0.32 and δ ≥ 0.56, 719
respectively. For δ ≥ 0.56, C/AB and, for a subset of values 720
of δ, also B/AC are stable. In particular, outcome C/AB, in 721
which the largest MNO C invests by itself whereas the smaller 722
MNOs A and B collaborate, is always stable for δ ≥ 0.1. 723
Concerning the number of BSs deployed by the stable con- 724
figurations (Tables IX), a little incentive from users (small δ) 725
forces MNOs to activate only a small number of BSs in order 726
to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an overall positive 727
profit. For example, for user distribution M2 and δ = 0.02, the 728
grand coalition is stable and it activates 74 BSs in area Z1, 729
69 BSs in area Z2 and 12 BSs in area Z3 (Table IXb). 730
However, as users are willing to pay more (larger values of δ), 731
more BSs are activated since higher revenues compensate the 732
costs of activating more BSs. 733
C. Comparison 734
We now compare the behavior of the socially optimal and 735
stable configurations. The impact of δ on the two config- 736
urations is overall very similar. However, there is incentive 737
for sharing for a larger range of the values of δ in order to 738
maximize the MNOs profits (i.e., for stable configurations) 739
compared to maximizing the global/minimum user rate (i.e. 740
for the socially optimal configurations). In other words, shared 741
networks can be more beneficial from the MNOs perspective 742
as sharing the network cost allows for larger profits but 743
less beneficial from the user perspective due to the service 744
level degradation experienced in more congested networks. 745
Consider for instance user distribution M1. The grand coalition 746
ABC is socially optimal for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.04] for T OTQ and 747
for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.06] for M I NQ , but it is stable for a larger 748
number of values of δ between 0.02 and 0.28. In general, 749
under M I NQ sharing is selected as optimal strategy only for 750
δ ≤ 0.22, while sharing configurations are stable for a wider 751
range of values (up to δ = 2), which means that for higher 752
values of δ no sharing should takes place in order to provide 753
the best service level, while there is incentive to share in order 754
to maximize the MNOs’ profit. 755
Regarding the level of investment, the higher the value of δ, 756
the denser the network deployment for both configurations 757
as larger revenues make up for increasing network cost. 758
Nevertheless, for the same value of δ more BSs are deployed 759
by the socially optimal configurations compared to the stable 760
ones, as the former focus on the user rate whereas the latter, 761
focusing on the profit, reflect the trade-off between increased 762
revenues and cost. For instance, for M1 and δ = 0.04, the 763
grand coalition is selected by T OTQ and it is stable; however, 764
it deploys 443 BSs in area Z1, 448 in Z2 and 274 in Z3 under 765
objective T OTQ (Tables VIa) whereas in order to maximize 766
the MNOs profit, 157 BSs are deployed in area Z1, 163 in Z2 767
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Fig. 1. Average user rate (Qavg ) and average profit (Pavg) vs. δ–user
distribution M2.
D. Performance Indicators Analysis769
We now analyze how different values of δ impact two770
key performance indicators for the users and the MNOs: the771
average user rate, Qavg =
∑
i∈O,a∈A qai





a∈A (rai −cai )|O| ; when multiple configura-773
tions are selected for the same value of δ (as reported in774
Tables IV, V, VII), we average also over the different con-775
figurations. In particular, we analyze the “price” of imposing776
a fair coalitional structure (objective M I NQ ).777
Results show that the socially optimal infrastructure sharing778
configurations outperform stable ones in terms Qavg and vice779
versa for Pavg . However, as users are willing to pay more, the780
two configuration types tend to provide very similar values of781
Qavg and Pavg.782
As similar observations regarding the behavior of Qavg and783
Pavg as a function of δ can be drawn for both user distributions784
M1 and M2, we report results concerning only M2 in Figure 1.785
As pointed out in Section V-A, the socially optimal con-786
figurations obtained applying objectives T OTQ and M I NQ787
are the same for most instances and they also provide very788
similar Qavg (the largest difference across all values of δ789
is approximately 1.1 Mbps) which can be observed by the790
overlap of their corresponding plots (see Figure 1). Therefore,791
solutions that are fair to all users in all the areas are also792
efficient.793
More BSs are activated by the socially optimal configu-794
rations than by stable ones (see Subsection V-C) which is795
reflected in their corresponding Qavg and Pavg . The difference796
in the Qavg provided by the socially optimal configurations797
and stable ones for δ = 0.02 is nearly 12.6 Mbps (45.8% gap);798
it goes down to 4.3 Mbps (8.1%) for δ = 1 and eventually799
Fig. 2. User rate (Q) vs. profit (P) for each area and MNO – user
distribution M2, δ = 0.02.
becomes nearly 1.8 Mbps (3.3%) for δ = 2. Thus, for high δ, 800
the two types of configurations provide roughly the same 801
quality of service to the users if they are very interested in 802
the new service. 803
As far as Pavg is concerned, for low values of δ, the differ- 804
ence in the Pavg provided by the two types of configurations 805
is significantly different (see Figure 1). For δ = 0.02, the 806
configuration selected by T OTQ provides on the average only 807
55.2 e per MNO, whereas the stable configurations pro- 808
vide 262306.3 e . This suggests that solutions obtained from 809
objectives T OTQ and M I NQ merely satisfy the constraint 810
on having a positive profit while providing, on the average, 811
a 12.6 Mbps higher user rate. However, with the increase of δ, 812
the difference in rate between the two types of configurations 813
becomes negligible, and so does the difference in profit (only 814
2.8% for δ = 2). 815
So far we have investigated the average performance indi- 816
cators (Qavg and Pavg). We now analyze how the user rate 817
per area and MNO (Q) and profit per area and MNO (P) are 818
affected by the characteristics of MNOs (market share) and by 819
the characteristics of the areas (size and population, reported 820
in Table III) for both configurations. 821
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of Q with respect to 822
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M2 when δ = 0.02. We recall that, when δ = 0.02, the824
grand coalition (ABC) is socially optimal (for both T OTQ825
and M I NQ objectives) and stable. For this scenario we can826
observe that: (i) the socially optimal configurations provide827
in every area higher user rates than the stable one, which in828
turn guarantee higher revenues, (ii) the grand coalition results829
in all MNOs providing the same user rate to users of the830
same area, while their profit follows their market shares (see831
Equations (12), (24)), (iii) in area Z3, MNOs obtain a negative832
profit under objective T OTQ , while the global profit for each833
MNO is positive, which indicates that a negative balance834
between costs and revenues can be accepted in some areas835
by the socially optimal configurations, (iv) the objective that836
favors fairness (M I NQ ) improves the quality of service of the837
users of the largest area (Z1) and most congested area (Z2) at838
the cost of lowering the user rate of area Z3 and (v) since the839
user rate provided by a given coalitional structure in an area840
depends on the user density, on the size of the area and on the841
number of BSs activated in that area, a slightly higher user842
rate is achieved for the small, low user density area (Z3) by843
the socially optimal configurations as the LTE nominal rate is844
divided among less users and on the average users are closer845
to their serving BSs.846
VI. CONCLUSIONS847
This work analyzes the strategic situation in which MNOs848
have to decide whether to invest in LTE small cells in dense849
urban areas and whether to share the investment with other850
MNOs. A mathematical framework is proposed to address the851
problem of infrastructure sharing for the considered scenario.852
This framework accounts for techno-economic parameters853
such as the achievable throughput and a general pricing model854
for the LTE service. The problem has been tackled from two855
perspectives: the one of a regulatory entity which imposes856
infrastructure sharing configurations that optimize the quality857
of service perceived by all users and the MNOs perspective,858
which captures their competitive and profit-maximizing nature.859
We propose an MILP formulation to determine socially opti-860
mal configurations (regulator perspective) and adopt concepts861
of cooperative game theory to determine stable configurations862
(MNOs perspective).863
Results show that sharing configurations obtained under864
both perspectives are strongly affected by how much users865
are willing to pay for the new services but they also depend866
on the user distribution (MNOs market shares). Sharing is867
appealing from both perspectives when users are willing to868
pay little, regardless of the MNOs market shares as they all869
struggle with high infrastructure cost. Instead, if users were870
willing to pay more, there is generally more incentive to share871
from the MNO perspective and in particular when MNOs have872
significantly different market shares. For both perspectives, the873
selected configurations involve less congested coalitions, that874
is, coalitions of fewer and smaller MNOs, when the market875
shares are significantly different. When the focus is on the876
quality of service, such configurations behave very similarly877
to the case when no sharing takes place, that is, users are best878
served either by less congested coalitions or when all MNOs879
build individual networks.880
Fig. 3. Simulated nominal user rate (ρa,noms ), average user rate (ρas ) and
adaptive piece-wise linearization for coalition ABC in area Z1 (20000 users,
4 km2).
The proposed mathematical framework has proved to be 881
a flexible instrument of limited complexity to analyze in 882
detail the possible strategies for different infrastructure sharing 883
configurations under different techno-economic conditions. 884
It can be further extended to incorporate spectrum man- 885
agement issues and therefore more elaborated game theory 886
models, as well as different classes of users and heterogeneous 887
technologies. 888
APPENDIX A 889
We recall that the nominal user rate (ρa,noms ) is computed by 890
means of the simulation described in Subsection IV-A whereas 891
the average user rate (ρas ) is derived from ρa,noms according 892
to Equations (27). ρas is then approximated by a concave 893
piecewise linear function in order to formulate the problem 894
as a MILP. 895
ρas = ρa,noms (1 − η)
∑
i∈Os σi Na
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (27) 896
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated nominal user rate ρa,noms , 897
the average user rate ρas and the piece-wise linear function 898
approximating ρas for coalition ABC in area Z1 (similarly for 899
all the other considered areas and coalitions). In the following, 900
we explain how the approximation was modeled in the MILP 901
formulation. 902
As mentioned, L denotes the number of linear pieces 903
(intervals) that approximate ρas . We have considered equal 904
values of L for all the coalitions s ∈ S and all the areas a ∈ A. 905
L was set to 11 for user distribution M1 and to 10 for M2. 906
For each interval l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, coalition s and area a, 907
[Ua,l−1s , Ua,ls ] represents the range of the number of BSs 908
that characterize the lth interval, Ra,ls is the average user rate 909
when s activates U a,ls BSs in a and αa,ls is the slope associated 910
with the lth interval. The average user rate ρas obtained by 911
activating uas BSs, with uas ∈ [Ua,l−1s , Ua,ls ], is therefore equal 912
to Ra,l−1s +αa,ls (uas −Ua,l−1s ). Equations (28) show how these 913
parameters are related with one another. 914
Ra,0s = ρas (1), ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, 915
Ra,ls = Ra,l−1s + αa,ls (Ua,ls − Ua,l−1s ), 916
∀s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (28) 917
In particular, Ua,0s is equal to 1, whereas U a,Ls is equal to 918
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obtained by activating uas BSs can be reformulated as:920
ρas = minl∈{0,...,L−1}{R
a,l
s + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls )},921
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (29)922
As ρas is maximized by any of the considered objective923
functions, Equations (29) can be replaced by Constraints (8).924
Notice that, the auxiliary binary variables zas equal zero when925
either no BSs are activated by s in a (uas = 0 and therefore926
zas = 0 due to Constraint (7)) or s is not active (ys = 0 and927
therefore zas = 0,∀a ∈ A due to Constraints (4) and (7)).928
In turn, when zas = 0, we should also have ρas = 0, which is929
guaranteed by Constraints (9) while Constraints (8) are made930
redundant by the term M(1 − zas ), where M = 1000.931
APPENDIX B932
The optimization problem with objective M I NQ and Con-933
straints (2)–(13) will be denoted by Infrastructure Sharing934
Problem (ISP).935
Theorem: The decision version of (ISP) is NP-complete.936
Proof: The decision version of (ISP) can be formulated937
as:938
Given a threshold Q¯ > 0 on the quality, are there variables939
ys, zas , uas and ρas , with s ∈ S and a ∈ A, such that Constraints940
(2)–(13) are satisfied and M I NQ ≥ Q¯?941
We will prove that the decision version of (ISP) is942
NP-complete by reduction from the Set Partitioning Problem943
(SPP) which is a well-known NP-complete problem (see,944
e.g., [36]). We recall the decision version of (SPP):945
Given a universe U, a family C of subsets of U and a946
positive integer K , is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| ≤ K947
and each element of the universe U belongs to exactly one948
member of C ′?949
The proof is carried out in 3 steps.950
1) The decision version of (ISP) is a NP problem because951
verifying that a given solution is a YES one requires952
O(|O| + L|S|) number of operations.953
2) It is possible to make a polynomial time transformation954
of any instance IS P P of the decision version of (SPP)955
into an instance II S P of the decision version of (ISP).956
Given IS P P=(U, C , K ), we build II S P=(O, S, A, Na ,957
{σi }i∈O , Umax , L, {Uls }Ll=0, {Rls}Ll=0, {αls}Ll=1, δ, D, g,958
Q¯) as follows:959
• O = U, S = C , |A| = 1, Na = |U|, σi = 1/|U| for960
any i ∈ O, Umax = K , L = K − 1.961
• For any coalition s ∈ S, we set U 0s = 1, U1s =962
2, . . . , U K−1s = K .963
• Given an arbitrary coalition s ∈ S, we set:964
R0s = |s|/|s| for any s ∈ S,965
Rls = Rl−1s + αls for any s ∈ S and l = 1, . . . ,966
K − 1,967
• For any coalition s ∈ S, we set R0s > α1s > α2s >968
· · · > αK−1s > 0.969




It is clear that such transformation can be done in971
polynomial time with respect to size of II S P .972
3) II S P is a YES instance if and only if IS P P is a YES973
instance.974
Fig. 4. Graphical illustration of the number of BSs activated by coalitions.
First, we prove the if part. Since IS P P is a YES instance, 975
there is a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| ≤ K and 976
each element of the universe U belongs to exactly one 977
member of C ′. We define the variables 978
ys = zas = uas =
{




R0s if s ∈ C ′,
0 otherwise.
979
It is easy to check that Constraints (2)–(5) are satisfied. 980
Constraint (6) is fulfilled since 981
∑
s∈S
uas = |C ′| ≤ K = Umax . 982
The values of variables zas , uas and ρas guarantee that 983
Constraints (7)–(9) hold. Furthermore, Constraints (13) 984
on the nonnegative profit of MNOs hold because 985
∑
a∈A


















s = 0. 987
Finally, since C ′ is a partition of O, any MNO i belongs 988
to a unique coalition si ∈ C ′ and qai = ρasi = R0si ≥ Q¯ 989
for any i ∈ O, that is M I NQ ≥ Q¯. Therefore, II S P is a 990
YES instance. 991
Now, we prove the only if part. Assume that 992
II S P is a YES instance, i.e., there are vari- 993
ables ys , zas , uas and ρas , with s ∈ S and 994
a ∈ A, such that all the Constraints (2)–(13) 995
are satisfied and M I NQ ≥ Q¯. For any i ∈ O we 996
have qai ≥ Q¯ > 0, hence we get from Constraints (4), 997
(7) and (9) that for any i ∈ O there exists a unique 998
coalition si ∈ Si such that ysi = 1. Thus, uasi ≥ 1 by 999














si = R0si uasi . 1003
Since 0 ≤ rai − cai = ρasi − R0si uasi , we obtain from 1004
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(i.e., ys = 1) the number of deployed BSs is uas = 1.1006
If we define1007
C ′ = {s ∈ S : ys = 1},1008
then C ′ is a partition of U and |C ′| = ∑s∈S uas ≤1009
Umax = K , therefore IS P P is a YES instance.1010
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